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SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT 
Progressive has never provided any valid justification for its alleged defenses.1 
Instead, it provides abstract assertions that insureds should not receive a "windfall"2 if no 
loss was incurred. But Mrs. Martinez suffered a loss. Progressive never alleged that Mrs. 
Martinez suffered no loss. Nothing in the record would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude there was no loss. Therefore, the abstractions relied on by Progressive are 
completely irrelevant and have the potential to be misleading. 
Injured motorists should be able to recover the reasonable value of all their out-of-
pocket expenses within 30 days of providing reasonable proof.3 The delay imposed by 
Progressive, coupled with its fractious defense, resulted years of litigation and attendant 
attorney fees incurred by Mrs. Martinez in contravention of the express purpose of the no-
fault statute. 
1
 Neither insurance adjusters, judges nor lawyers are capable of understanding or 
applying the "standard" that Progressive calls "reasonable and necessary." The stock 
phrases and "magic words" certainly carry no talismanic assurance of comprehension by 
injured motorists untrained in the law. See Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 771 P.2d 
1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989). 
2
 Plaintiff seeks full reimbursement (not a "windfall") consistent with the law of 
damages "so that she may be restored, as nearly as possible, to the position she was in 
prior to the injury." Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 939 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Utah App. 
1997) (citations omitted). 
3
 "Under contract principles the [insured motorist] should not be denied benefits 
unless a provision in the statutory contract between the [insured motorist], the state, 
and the [PIP carrier] explicitly suspends the benefits." King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 
P.2d 1281 (Utah 1993) (interpreting the Workers' Compensation Act) (citation omitted). 
The foregoing statement of law is even more suited to PIP contracts for several reasons: 
(1) PIP benefits are limited to specific amounts; (2) PIP contracts are first-party contracts 
for which the insured has personally paid the premium, whereas injured employees are 
third-party claimants; and (3) The current statutory language of the no-fault statute 
affords no delay pursuant to Section 31 A-22-309(5). 
Progressive must pay the attorney fees owed by Mrs. Martinez to her attorneys. If it 
were allowed to unilaterally reduce its contractual obligation through nothing more than 
stubborn litigiousness, // would receive a windfall.4 Many laws are enacted to prohibit bad 
people from doing bad things. The attorney fees provision of the no-fault statute was 
enacted to encourage good people to do good things. The trial court's refusal to award 
attorney fees despite the statutory imperative undermines legislative intent. The district 
court's failure to comply with the law would discourage all future enforcement of the no-
fault statute. 
RESPONSES TO PROGRESSIVES "FACTS" 
The relevant facts have never been disputed: (1) Mrs. Martinez incurred over $1,000 
in medical expenses which were not paid for her second accident because Progressive 
claimed, without any admissible evidence, that her husband waived5 her right to payment 
4
 "Utah's no-fault insurance statute provides first party compensation, thereby 
enabling an injured party to expeditiously obtain recompense for financial needs, 
without bearing the expense and lengthy delay associated with litigation to establish 
fault. In return for the disallowance of general damages ("all damages other than those 
awarded for economic losses"), a tort victim is given immediate payment of medical 
expenses and lost wages. The Utah no-fault insurance law has no effect on a tort victim's 
ability to completely recover pecuniary losses." Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 558-
59 (Utah App. 1997) (emphasis added). If a PIP carrier can simply deny payment of PIP 
benefits, does this determination mean that the tortfeasor's partial tort immunity is 
eliminated too? It must follow that the insured tortfeasor is not immune from suit if 
special damages are "not covered" by PIP coverage. See, e^g., ROBERT KEETON & ALAN 
I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW, § 4.10 at p. 419 (2d ed. 1988). 
5
 Progressive never used the legal term "waived" and instead claimed that it was 
"justified" in cutting off benefits because of this alleged statement which Plaintiff denies 
was made, and if it was made was taken out of context, and if it was made it was 
irrelevant because he had no legal authority to waive her contractual right. Mrs. Martinez 
sought legal counsel mere days after the alleged waiver. Moreover, Progressive failed to 
attempt to bear its burden of proof. See R590-190 attached hereto as EXHIBIT B. 
2 
for these bills; (2) Mrs. Martinez was advised not to work by her doctors because of the 
injury to her sympathetic nerve (Horner's Syndrome), yet Progressive refused to pay her 
lost wages benefits because Progressive wanted to hire CorVel to do some sort of 
"investigation" that is not allowed by the statute;6 (3) Mrs. Martinez hired a woman to clean 
her house, take care of her three small children and husband, and to prepare meals and do 
laundry for $20 per day, yet Progressive called the work "not reasonable and necessary" 
compared to a chart authored by its claims adjuster after Progressive had received 
reasonable proof; (4) Progressive ultimately was required by the underlying action to pay 
$13,424.83 for past-due PIP benefits. But see Opp. at p. 4, Tf 18 (claiming that Plaintiff 
pursued "a $3,000 PIP claim" which, if believed, would discount Plaintiffs successful 
results); and (5) Mrs. Martinez incurred a debt of $72,885 to her attorneys for their 
successful protection of her contractual and statutory rights. 
Progressive's 13. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment which was fully 
supported and uncontroverted, and Defendant responded with an unsupported cross motion 
(it attached several letters it had written). See Kimball & Boyce, Utah Evidence Law at 8-
328-34. Judge McCleve granted Defendant's premature, unsupported motion by adopting 
Progressive's arguments.7 (Record 265). 
6
 When a PIP carrier refuses to pay lost wages, the insured is faced with a 
Hobson's choice, disobey the treating physician or attempt to meet daily living expenses 
without income or promised (and paid for) benefits. Mrs. Martinez went back to work. 
So she had no "loss" of wages after being cut off, and therefore received no lost wages 
benefits for the time period after returning to work. Plaintiff does not deny the 
profitability of Progressive's assertions (for it). But see Pugh v. North Am. Warr. Svcs., 
2000 UT App 121, If 20, 1 P.3d 570. 
7
 But See e ^ Bright v. Westmoreland County, 380 F.3d 729 (3rd Cir. 2004) 
("Judicial opinions are the core work-product of judges. They are much more than findings 
3 
Progressive's 5, 6, 7, 8. 9, 10, 11. Page 100 of the record is a divider. The 80% 
assertion is not supported anywhere in the record and its alleged relevance is not, and never 
was, explained in violation of R590-190-10(2). Progressive's letter regarding whether Mrs. 
Martinez felt "worse" was neither relevant nor admissible to prove that assertion; rather the 
record demonstrates Progressive presented a false choice to Plaintiff in violation of R590-
190-9(8). (Record 184-85 is the only time Progressive purported to set forth a transcription 
(in a reply memorandum), but the alleged transcript was not sworn or complete). The 
alleged statement by Mr. Martinez is not relevant. The letter written by Progressive 
asserting a statement was not admissible for that purpose. There is no record of CorVel 
doing anything. The letter written by Progressive asserting their inability to perform a 
function that is not contemplated by the no-fault statute is not admissible to prove anything 
that might be relevant and is in violation of R590-190-8. See also Connor v. Union Pacific 
R.R. Co., 972 P.2d 414, 417-18 (Utah 1998) (holding motion for summary judgment 
supported by mere assertions improperly granted). 
Plaintiffs Facts. Progressive does not challenge the facts as stated by Plaintiff in 
her opening brief. 
of fact and conclusions of law; they constitute the logical and analytical explanations of why 
a judge arrived at a specific decision. They are tangible proof to the litigants that the judge 
actively wrestled with their claims and arguments and made a scholarly decision based on his 
or her own reason and logic. When a court adopts a party's proposed opinion as its own, the 
court vitiates the vital purposes served by judicial opinions. * * * Courts and judges exist to 
provide neutral fora in which persons and entities can have their professional disputes and 
personal crises resolved. Any degree of impropriety, or even the appearance thereof, 
undermines our legitimacy and effectiveness."); Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 
P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) ("The functions of issue-formulation and fact-revelation are 
appropriately left to the deposition-discovery process."); Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 
f^ 32 ("Because these [material] facts were not developed below, the grant of summary 
judgment was premature."). 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. PROGRESSIVE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 7(f)(2) 
PREVENTED THE "FILING" OF THE MINUTE ENTRY. 
This Court lacked jurisdiction over the previous notice of appeal because it was 
premature. Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "requires that copies of a 
proposed judgment be served on opposing counsel before being presented to the court. The 
notice requirement of Rule [7(f)(2)] . . . is supplemental to and not inconsistent with Rule 
58A To harmonize and give proper effect to these rules, we hold that compliance with 
Rule [7(f)(2)] is necessary in order that a judgment be properly 'filed' as that term is used 
in Rule 58A... ." Bigelow v. Ingersoll. 618 P.2d 50, 52 (Utah 1980). 
The Notice of Appeal filed September 15, 2004 provides this Court with jurisdiction 
over the entire underlying matter. The minute entry dated April 6, 2004 cannot be 
considered to have been "filed"8 and this failure of a condition prevented the ruling from 
being "entered" which in turn prevented the time for appeal from running. Calfo v. D.C. 
Stewart Co.. 717 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1986). "Because Rule [7(f)(2)] was not complied 
with here, there was no judgment from which an appeal could be taken until [August 16, 
2004]." Id 
Progressive fails to acknowledge its failure to comply with Rule 7(f)(2) and fails to 
acknowledge the binding law cited by Plaintiff in her opening brief. Opp. at pp. 6-9. 
Instead, it asserts that the minute entry did not contemplate further action. Id at p. 7 (citing 
State v. Leatherbury). By citing an abstract rule from a criminal case and assuming similar 
8
 Progressive argues (Opp. at p. 11) that Rule 58A(d) controls the issue of notice. 
Notice is not the issue. "Filing" is the issue. This issue is addressed in Rule 58A(c). 
5 
facts, Progressive assumes the same rule applies. However, Progressive knows that the 
facts are not similar. Rule 7 provides that a minute entry's silence as to preparation of an 
order compelled further action by Progressive. It failed to take further action. Its failure to 
comply with Rule 7 does not divest Mrs. Martinez of her constitutional right of appeal. 
II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFF JUSTIFIABLY RELIED ON 
RULE 7(f)(2) WHILE WAITING FOR PROGRESSIVE TO PREPARE 
AN ORDER, AND JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE IS EXCUSABLE 
NEGLECT, MISTAKE, INADVERTENCE, AND SURPRISE. 
Essentially, Progressive claims that Plaintiff unreasonably waited for it and the 
district court to comply with the process required by Rule 7. Opp. at p. 10-11. This 
assertion stands in stark contrast to the purpose of rules. The Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure exist in order to avoid expensive disputes relating to the proper administration of 
justice by providing guidance in advance. Plaintiff is aware of no law which might exempt 
Progressive from being required to obey Rule 7. Therefore, Plaintiffs delay9 while 
attempting to obtain clarification relating to Progressive's and the district court's 
compliance with Rule 7 was not unreasonable. 
Rule 7(f)(2) required Progressive to prepare an order to formalize the district court's 
ruling contained in its minute entry.10 The language of the rule is "shall" and the time for 
9
 Plaintiff did not "delay" because there was no Rule 7 compliant order. 
10
 Progressive argues (Opp. At p. 10) that "a reasonable attorney . . . would have 
known that" a notice of appeal should be filed within 30 days of an order. Progressive's 
argument begs the question: When was an order filed? Only by assuming the truth of the 
contested condition can Progressive conclude the contingent rule applies. Circular 
assumptions do not constitute analysis. An appellee's brief may be frivolous if it consists 
"of irrelevant and illogical arguments based on factual misrepresentations and false 
premises." Romala Corp. v. United States. 927 F.2d 1219, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see 
6 
compliance is 15 days. And (a) the district court did not direct an alternate procedure; and 
(b) Progressive did not prepare an order within 15 days. 
About 15 days after the minute entry was created, Plaintiff was justifiably concerned 
about her right of appeal. Plaintiff inquired if the district court planned to issue an 
amended minute entry11 or whether it intended to order Progressive to comply with Rule 
7(f)(2). 
The district court's clerk promised Plaintiff that she would ask the judge for 
guidance and return Plaintiffs telephone calls. She did not respond. Reliance on the 
promise made by the district court was not unreasonable. Litigants are entitled to expect 
the district courts to fulfill promises. 
III. $0.00 FOR NEARLY EIGHT YEARS OF LITIGATION IS NOT 
REASONABLE UNDER ANY STANDARD. 
The record reveals no substantial evidence to support an award of $0.00. State v. 
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to 
award less than the amount of fees claimed absent reasonable justification. Bell v. Bell 810 
P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 1991). Indeed, this Court has made it clear that a trial court 
"'abuses its discretion in awarding less than the amount [of attorney fees] requested unless 
the reduction is warranted' by one or more of the [Dixie] factors." Endrody v. Endrody. 
914 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). It is 
also Opp. at 16 ("The plaintiff did nothing to pursue his [sic] breach of contract [cause of 
action]...." but see, e ^ , R. 24, R. 268, R. 320, R. 583). 
11
 A nunc pro tunc order is used to "correct the court's omission or error." In re 
Estate of Leone, 860 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah App. 1993). 
7 
undisputed that the district court did not rely on, or find any facts relating to, any of the 
Dixie factors.12 And Progressive indisputably provided no evidence to contradict Plaintiffs 
affidavit or the contents of the record.13 
[N]either the court nor the jury should be permitted to stubbornly 
ignore and refuse to be guided by competent, credible and 
uncontradicted evidence. The arbitrary and unreasoning imposition of 
one man's will upon another is the essence of tyranny and the 
antithesis of justice. Not even an American jury with its unquestioned 
broad discretion should be permitted to so flout the rights of those who 
seek civil justice. 
Arnold Machinery Company, Inc. v. Intrusion Prepakt Inc., 357 P.2d 496 (Utah 1960) 
(noting, in the same paragraph, that such principles simultaneously do not bind a fact finder 
to accept self-interested evidence whole cloth; rather a jury's determination should not be 
disturbed so long as it appears to be within the limits of reason). The district court 
disregarded the contents of the record and the uncontroverted evidence.14 
12
 The district court named some of the Dixie factors, but the refusal to enforce the 
attorney fees provision seems to have been primarily predicated on the notion (with no 
adequate findings) that the allocation was insufficient (a legal conclusion applying the 
wrong standard to the undisputed facts) (Record 857, lines 11-15). 
13
 See Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 537 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975) 
(treating request for attorney fees as a summary judgment motion where, as here, petition 
was unrebutted); "Unless the record clearly and uncontrovertedly support's the trial court's 
decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact precludes appellate review of the 
evidentiary basis underlying the trial court's decision and requires remand for more 
detailed findings by the trial court." Quinn v. Ouinn. 830 P.2d 282, 286 (Utah App. 1992). 
14
 "The . . . act here involved . . . contemplates disbursements to the prevailing 
party in every case. The court has no right to deny those necessarily paid or incurred. 
They follow the verdict as a matter of course." Checketts v. Collings, 78 Utah 93, 1 P.2d 
950 (1931) (discussing costs under a statute that appears to have preceded Rule 54). 
8 
IV. THE FEE-SHIFTING PROVISION OF THE NO-FAULT STATUTE 
REQUIRES PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
The legislature adopted what is called a "fee-shifting" statute when it adopted the 
no-fault statute. The purpose of fee-shifting statutes is, essentially, twofold: (a) to 
encourage those who are governed by the statute to comply with its terms; and (b) to 
encourage attorneys to enforce compliance when retained by one whose rights under the 
statute were disregarded. Both of these purposes would be undermined by failing to order 
Progressive to pay a reasonable attorney fee.15 "The rationale of fee-shifting rules is that 
the victor should be made whole — should be as well off as if the opponent had 
respected h[er] legal rights in the first place. This cannot be accomplished if the victor 
must pay for the appeal [and all other litigation] out of h[er] own pocket." Rickels v. South 
Bend, 33 F.3d 785, 787 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added): see also Commissioner of INS v. 
Jean, 496 U.S. 154(1990). 
Payment of attorney fees is mandatory under the no-fault statute. If this Court were 
to fail to reverse the district court and remand this matter for appropriate consideration 
under the proper legal rules, such inaction would encourage Progressive and other insurers 
to continue to deny PIP benefits to injured motorists in contravention of the legislative 
15
 This case violates an important principle: "A request for attorney's fees should 
not result in a second major litigation." Hensley v. Eckerhart 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). 
The Court should avoid an interpretation of this fee-shifting statute that will spawn new 
litigation of a significant dimension. See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. 
Co., 2001 UT 89, Tl 121, 65 P.3d 1134 (approving "actual fees" as the proper measure of 
the amount of fees). And the Court should properly interpret the scope of coverage 
required by the no-fault statute in order to reduce the need for future litigation. 
9 
intent underlying the no-fault statute by eliminating any downside risk.16 
When an attorney agrees to assist an injured motorist whose insurance company 
refuses to comply with the no-fault statute, the attorney ordinarily cannot obtain a share of 
the PIP benefits because those benefits are intended to assist the injured motorist with daily 
living expenses. When the efforts of the attorney result, as here, in requiring the insurance 
company to comply with the law, his actions are "vindicating a policy that [the legislature] 
considered of the highest priority. If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear 
their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the 
public interest by invoking the . . . powers of the [state] courts." Newman v. Piggie Park 
Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (discussing Title II racial discrimination injunctions 
and the requirement that attorney fees be awarded under that provision). 
V. LEGAL STANDARD UNDER THE FEE-SHIFTING STATUTE. 
The attorney "fee provision [of the no-fault statute] was needed 'to encourage 
private enforcement because lack of judicial interpretation hampered the act's 
effectiveness^7] and penalties for noncompliance would otherwise be inadequate.'" L.A. 
16
 An insurer "with its greater resources and expertise can in effect coerce 
compliance with its position. Where compliance is coerced, precedent may be established 
on the basis of an uncontested order rather than the thoughtful presentation and 
consideration of opposing views." Jean, 496 U.S. at n. 14. 
17
 Progressive's brief underscores the imbalance that exists between insureds and 
PIP carriers and the need for increased private enforcement and judicial guidance. It has 
been decades since the no-fault statute received appropriate judicial interpretation 
regarding the scope of coverage and the trigger of coverage. The imbalance is evidenced, 
for example, by Progressive's request that the Court abandon the American Rule and 
award it attorney fees because it alleges Mrs. Martinez seeks to "make new law." 
"Making new law" is the purpose of appellate courts whose role it is to develop a 
10 
Times Comm. v. L.A. Ctv. Board, Supvr., 112 Cal.App. 4th 1313, 1327 (Ct. App. Cal. 2nd 
Dist., Div. 8 2003) (applying the Piggie Park standard to the Brown Act). Because the 
legislature requires payment of attorney fees to vindicate important statutory rights by 
private enforcement, the general rule holds that plaintiffs must ordinarily recover their fees 
unless special circumstances would make the fee award unjust. See Society of Professional 
Journalists v. Briggs. 687 F.Supp. 1521, 1523 (D. Utah 1988). The burden of proving 
"special circumstances" rests with the defendant who must provide a "strong showing" that 
such circumstances exist. And denial of fee awards on that basis arise only in unusual 
situations that are not present in this case. See Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 624 
F.2d 539, 544 (5th Cir. 1980). In sum, in order to advance the legislative intent of the no-
fault statute, attorney fees are awarded as a matter of course — lest denial become the rule 
rather than the unusual exception. See J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie. 767 F.2d 
1469, 1474-75 (10th Cir. 1985). 
VI. FEE-SHIFTING PRINCIPLES UNDER UTAH LAW. 
In Prince v. Bear River, the Utah Supreme Court employed the language of 
fee-shifting cases when affirming the arbitrary $450 award18 despite the absence of any 
common law jurisprudence which provides gloss for statutes enacted by the legislature in 
derogation of common law (the tort-based defenses raised by Progressive were abrogated 
in 1973). It is also the purpose for the no-fault statute's fee-shifting provision. 
18
 Progressive proposes an arbitrary award of $500: "In the present case, a similar 
type of award is necessary." Opp. at p. 16. While Plaintiff appreciates Progressive's 
concession that $0.00 is unreasonable on its face, the $500 suggestion is arbitrary and 
similarly unreasonable. Progressive's basis is its assertion: "Other than filing the original 
complaint, there was no discovery, motions, memoranda, or arguments presented to the 
trial court regarding the breach of contract claim." Id. This assertion is not consistent 
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factual findings supporting the extreme reduction.19 The court declared the breach of 
contract issue "moot" and it discussed a version of the "prevailing party" concept. 
Mootness is primarily a doctrine derived from Article III courts and their limited 
jurisdiction;20 whereas state courts enjoy plenary jurisdiction. And the "prevailing party" 
concept has existed for a very long time,21 but it does not exist in Utah's no-fault statute 
thereby giving rise to the inference that the legislature knew of the term and chose not to 
employ it. The Utah Supreme Court entered its "mootness" ruling without any substantial 
analysis. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 68, f 26, 56 P.3d 524. It seems to 
have concluded that Bear River's "voluntary" payment "mooted" Prince's claim. Id. at ^ 
56. However, "[i]t is well settled that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged 
practice does not deprive a . . . court of its power to determine the legality of the practice" 
unless it is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be 
expected to recur." Buckhannon 532 U.S. at 609 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (citations omitted). The 
with the record. (R. 1 through 857). 
19
 A primary basis for the court's decision to affirm was the lack of allocation. 
The court raised that issue sua sponte. There was allocation, but there was no 
presentation of unallocated time. Plaintiffs counsel did not include a transcript in the 
record thereby depriving the court of evidence that both counsel for the defendant and the 
trial court had explicitly waived disclosure of unallocated time. 
20
 The court did not explore the nuances of what has been called the "flexible 
character of the Article III mootness doctrine." United States Parole Commission v. 
Geraghtv. 445 U.S. 388, 402-04, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1211-12, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). 
21
 See Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Va. D.H.R.R.. 532 U.S. 598. 
610-11 (2001) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing Mansfield C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 
U.S. 379, 387 (1884)). 
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Prince court affirmed Bear River's legal obligation to pay attorney fees, and it addressed 
the amount as a separate issue.22 
Although the Prince reasoning is not very clear, it is easily distinguishable. The 
situations giving rise to the "voluntary," "moot," and "prevailing party" discussion are not 
present in the instant case. Therefore, the Prince court's apparent implementation of the 
fee-shifting caselaw from federal and state courts supports an entirely different result. 
The district court's order in which Progressive agreed to pay all past due PIP 
benefits together with interest due was Progressive's response to the court's order that 
Progressive be required to provide the discovery requested by Mrs. Martinez.23 (R. 630 
and EXHIBIT A). In addition to agreeing to pay all past-due benefits, Progressive waived its 
right to argue that its actions were "not 'required by the action.'" Id, 
The "judicial imprimatur" on this settlement made Mrs. Martinez the "prevailing 
party" under federal and Utah caselaw because it effected a sufficient change in the legal 
The court's separate treatment of the attorney fees obligation was legal error 
which led to the separate legal error relating to allocation because proper analysis cannot 
be divorced from guiding legal principles. Under the no-fault statute, attorney fees are 
not "consequential damages." Attorney fees is an explicit benefit the payment of which is 
contingent only on a finding (or as in this case a waiver of the defense) that the insurer 
was "required by the action" to pay benefits. The allocation burden arises out of the 
second prong of a consequential damages analysis, but this fee-shifting statute gives rise 
to normal contractual damages. Those courts that hold that the lack of allocation justifies 
a reduction or denial are implicitly premised on the plaintiffs failure to satisfy one of the 
required elements of the consequential damages analysis. At any rate, Plaintiff did 
allocate fees in this case (Record 676). So this issue is truly "moot." However, the 
analysis is helpful to the Court's understanding of the particular contract and statutory 
scheme at issue. 
23
 Progressive asserts (Opp. at p. 16) there was "no discovery," but this assertion is 
belied by the contents of the record. (E.g., Record 418-424). 
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relationship as contrasted with a purely "voluntary" payment. But more importantly, 
Progressive's express waiver of its sole defense to payment of attorney fees satisfied the 
plain language of Section 309(5) of the no-fault statute. 
Returning to the "reasonableness" of $0.00 for nearly eight (8) years of successful 
litigation, the Court must consider the intent of the legislature in enacting the no-fault 
statute rather than decontextualized comments pulled from caselaw involving commercial 
contracts or punishment. It is well-settled that the rates charged and hours billed are not 
conclusive of the amount of a reasonable fee. It is also well-settled that a litigant waives 
the right to attorney fees if claims are not presented to the district court.24 
The proper test to apply for attorney fee benefits under the no-fault statute is the 
same as that applied to federal civil rights actions and other fee-shifting statutes as the 
Prince court's discussion implies. The trial court's discretion under this standard for 
attorney fee awards "has been interpreted very narrowly. [25] To act as an effective 
incentive for injured parties to seek judicial relief for their civil rights violations, 'fee 
24
 If Plaintiff had requested $50 per hour, she would have waived the right to 
receive proper compensation. And if Plaintiff had allocated compensable work to a 
non-compensable category, that allocation would serve as a waiver of those hours. Given 
the caselaw, Progressive's complaints regarding the amounts claimed are not well-taken. 
The district court could have made reasoned deductions if it had found relevant facts. 
25
 In addition to narrowing the discretion because this is a fee-shifting statute, the 
Court must recognize that Judge Quinn was not in a superior position to understand the 
nature of the litigation. The only participation in this case by Judge Quinn was his refusal 
to enforce the attorney fees provision of the no-fault statute. Therefore, the traditional 
justification for affording broad discretion to district courts is completely lacking. A 
review that approximates a de novo review is appropriate. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
937 (Utah 1994) (assigning de novo review where issue is applying legal principles to 
undisputed facts). 
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awards should be the rule rather than the exception.'" L.A. Times 112 Cal. App. 4th at 1327. 
"In short, the trial court has the discretion to deny successful. . . plaintiffs their attorney 
fees, but only if the defendant shows special circumstances . . . ." Id And the district court 
cannot decrease a fee award based on factors not raised at all by the adverse party. Rode v. 
Dellarciprete. 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
The Utah Supreme Court employed a variation of this standard when it refused to 
defer to the decision of an administrative agency when attorney fees were improperly 
reduced. Barker v. Utah Public Service Com'n, 970 P.2d 702, 711 (Utah 1998) (affording 
no deference to the agency's reduction of attorney fees in a common fund case and 
applying a multiplier of 2.5 for risk of nonpayment and public benefit). The administrative 
agency, like the district court in this case, misunderstood that the law encourages attorneys 
to protect legal rights. Unjustified reductions would discourage lawyers from taking risks 
that inure to the benefit of members of the public. That case also took six years of 
litigation. The lawyers in that case were awarded $1.2 million dollars. 
Progressive claims that $72,885 is "outlandish" (Opp. at p. 9) and "incredulous 
[sic]" (Opp. at p. 14), but it fails to compare the attorney fees in this case to its own 
attorney fees debt (the best point of comparison) or anything else — such as the amount of 
attorney fees incurred in other cases that took six years to litigate. The word "outlandish" 
seems to imply a comparison in order to be constructive. 
Progressive seems to raise five objections: (1) it objects to $500 per hour as being 
pricey; (2) it objects to what it calls "double billing" for 15 date/time entries; (3) it contends 
15 
"there was no discovery, motions, memoranda, or arguments presented to the trial court 
regarding the breach of contract claim;" (4) it contends Mrs. Martinez's counsel failed to 
make an allocation of time and fees; and (5) it contends the issues are neither novel nor 
complex. Opp. at 14-18. Plaintiff will consider each of these criticisms, and the absence of 
any supporting evidence provided by Progressive in support of each objection, in turn.26 
First, $500.00 per hour must be viewed as the opportunity cost of a personal injury 
lawyer27 taking time away from obtaining tort settlements in order to prosecute a contract 
action against an insurance company. Barker 970 P.2d at 712. The opportunity costs 
include the time value of money and the lost opportunity to bill for other cases together 
with the risk that the attorney fees requirement of Section 309(5) would be disregarded by 
the district court. $500 per hour is reasonable on the basis of time, effort, and expertise. 
Second, Progressive provides no evidence there was "double billing." The only 
evidence before the district court was that the research in Prince and Martinez was shared. 
(Record at 554). In other words, Bear River was billed for half (which it unjustly did not 
pay) and Progressive was billed for half. Conjecture is not admissible evidence. 
26
 The argument that is oddly lacking is Judge Quinn's argument: "credibility." 
Plaintiff will merely point out that her attorney's affidavit was fully corroborated by the 
contents of the record. A trier of fact may not disregard unrebutted and sworn testimony 
provided by an officer of the court based on the pretense of a "credibility" determination 
when the testimony is corroborated by the court's own record. See, e ^ , Gittens v. 
Lundberg, 284 P.2d 1115 (Utah 1955). 
27
 The major personal injury firms are composed of about eight attorneys each. 
The cost of their annual advertising is in the neighborhood of $2 million dollars. This 
means that those personal injury firms need to make about $125 per hour simply to pay 
for advertising. See http://deseretnews.eom/dn/view/0,1249,600128272,00.html 
(revealing that the 10 members of a local p.i. firm average about $360 per hour). 
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Third, there was a substantial number of motions, memoranda and discovery. A 
motion to compel discovery gave rise Progressive's payment of the benefits owed by Mrs. 
Martinez to all other third-parties (besides her attorney). Progressive's assertion that there 
were no motions and no discovery is not consistent with the record.28 
Fourth, Progressive asserts there was no allocation, but that assertion is not true. See 
EXHIBIT C (R. 676). Mrs. Martinez apportioned compensable and non-compensable hours. 
Moreover, no allocation is required under this fee-shifting statute where all the claims were 
inextricably intertwined with a common core of facts. "[W]hen a plaintiff brings multiple 
claims involving a common core of facts and related legal theories, and prevails on at least 
some of its claims, it is entitled to compensation for all attorney fees reasonably 
incurred in the litigation." Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App. 355, ^  20, 
993 P.2d 222.29 
Finally, the nature of PIP benefits and the legal underpinnings of the statute are very 
complex. The statute's lawful implementation would be simple, but Progressive's tort-
based defenses, made-up defenses, and unsupported factual assertions make it very 
28
 The district court's conclusions can only be understood as the wholesale 
adoption of Progressive's numerous misstatements of fact and law. But see Boyer Co. v. 
Lignell 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977) (discouraging courts from mechanically adopting 
findings of fact prepared and submitted by the prevailing party's attorney (i.e., delegating 
rulings)). 
29
 It is true that Prince discussed abstract rules regarding allocation and affirmed 
the arbitrary award based on a total failure to allocate; however, its analysis was based on 
its refusal to apply the no-fault statute under its "mootness" ruling. Therefore, the dicta 
from Prince is not binding. See, e.g.. Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. 
Demisay, 508 U.S. 581, 592 n.5 (1993) (declaring statements in earlier cases dicta 
because they were "uninvited, unargued, and unnecessary to the Court's holdings"). 
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difficult. A careful examination of the complex underpinning of the statute reveals the 
flaws inherent in Progressive's position. 
VII. "REASONABLE AND NECESSARY" IS A MIXED QUESTION OF 
LAW AND FACT. 
Progressive argues that it is clear that reasonable and necessary is a standard that 
creates a question of fact regarding the meaning of material statutory terms. Opp. at p. 18. 
It asserts that it would be defenseless30 if this were not so. IcL But Progressive provides the 
Court with no guidance on how it purports to apply this standard to any particular claim or 
30
 Progressive strenuously repeats (e.g., Opp. at p. 24) that it should not have to 
pay "when no loss was actually suffered" and "and without consideration of their 
reasonableness or necessity." This illustrates Progressive's misunderstanding of the 
difference between the insured's duty to complete the proof of loss forms required by 
Section 31A-21-312 (proof of loss forms are to prove to the satisfaction of the contract 
that a loss was actually suffered, and Progressive never disputed her proof of loss; it 
merely attempted to mischaracterize the losses) and the very different possibility that it 
might be able to prove an affirmative defense that is adequately explained in its policy. 
"In terms of legal principles, this distinction resembles the distinction between a 
'substantive' right, and the 'procedure' by which that right may be established or 
enforced. This fundamental distinction between the loss, in fact, being within coverage, 
and the manner by which the insured goes about establishing this to the insurer's 
satisfaction, tends to get blurred with unfortunate frequency . . . . " Couch on Insurance 
3d, §193:19 (emphasis added). It has long been the law: "When an insured claims a right 
to recover under the accident provisions of the policy, all he need do is bring himself 
within the field therein defined and show his injury or disability was proximately and 
predominantly caused through violent, external and accidental means. He then has 
brought himself within the policy, and the terms thereof have been met . . . . When he 
brings himself within the insuring clause he has made his case . . . and any exceptions 
or conditions which would then deny him relief, take him out of the indemnity provisions, 
render them inoperative as to him, are matters of defense, and the burden thereof rests 
upon the insurer [Limitations, exceptions or conditions which may relieve the 
insurer from liability, which may be set forth in the policy outside of the language of the 
insuring clause, or which may exist outside of the policy entirely, must be made and 
established by the insurer to escape liability thereunder." Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. 
Soc'v. 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989) (citation omitted). 
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why it believes it can invoke this standard to deny benefits under coverages that omit this 
standard.31 Id. at pp. 18-24. The facts in this case are undisputed. The absence of legal 
rules that can be applied spawned these many years of litigation. 
"Reasonable value" unquestionably limits a PIP carrier's obligation to pay more for 
an insured's "all expenses" than the amount set forth in the relative value study. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 31A-22-307(2). "Reasonably incurred" is not defined. "Necessary" medical 
treatment is not defined. And there is no vague32 adjective for Progressive to rely on in the 
lost wages coverage section. Are these adjectives objective? Are they qualitative? Do 
they reserve discretion to one party or the other?33 Do they create evidentiary 
presumptions? Can the existence of these adjectives render the 30-day payment obligation 
meaningless?34 Are they merely warranties, descriptive terms, stipulations, conditions,35 
31
 No matter what other states have done with different no-fault statutes, the 
contractual principle continues to apply: Progressive cannot make up conditions that 
do not exist in the statute or contract. This is called "post-claim underwriting" and it is 
unlawful. Progressive's assertions are "in blatant contravention of the express purpose of 
the statute" to provide prompt and efficient indemnification. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Clyde. 920 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). 
32
 "When state action impinges on fundamental rights, strict compliance with due 
process must be observed. A statute which affects fundamental liberties is 
unconstitutional if it is so vague that 'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning... .'" In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted); accord 
Skaggs Drug Centers. Inc. v. Ashley, 484 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1971) (applying 
vagueness doctrine to a civil matter). 
33
 But see R590-218 (prohibiting reservation of discretion clauses). 
34
 See Couch on Insurance 3d §189:64 at pp. 189-75, 76 ("Where a statute 
requires payment within 30 days after receipt of reasonable proof of loss and amount of 
expenses, it has been held that an automobile insurer could not require an insured to 
submit all supporting medical records before the 30-day time period for payment of 
19 
exclusions, or exceptions? "Simple" this is not.36 But see Opp. at p. 17. 
Judge Ambro of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently provided a helpful 
analysis to be applied to this circumstance: 
For example, imagine that a man is appealing his conviction under a 
law that states "it is a crime to be tall." What kind of question is: 
"Was the trial court correct to find the man 'tall'?" Can we answer it 
solely by determining the facts of the case? No, because even if we 
know the fact that the man is five feet ten inches, we do not know if he 
is "tall" in the sense that Congress intended the word "tall" to 
mean.[37] Can we answer it solely by determining what the relevant 
law means without knowing the man's height? No, because even if we 
know that the statute defines "tall" as "six feet or taller," we do not 
know how tall the man is. Thus, we have a mixed question of fact and 
law. Once we know the facts of the case (that the man is five feet ten 
inches tall), and what the relevant law means (it is a crime to be six 
personal injury protection benefits began to run by where defining "reasonable proof of 
claim" to include all supporting medical records would allow the insurer to have 
unilateral power to determine reasonable proof of loss thereby circumventing the 
insurer's obligation to pay within 30 days and obliterating the period."). 
35
 See S&q Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735 (Utah 1996) 
("S&G's argument does not withstand scrutiny. The change order could not have created 
a condition precedent to a claim that had accrued ten months earlier."); Hertz v. Nordic 
Ltd. Inc., 761 P.2d 959, 963 (Utah App. 1988) (stating "no one can avail himself of the 
non-performance of a condition precedent, who has himself occasioned its non-
performance"). 
36
 This should have been simple. See, e.g., Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 
P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1981) (explaining that proof of loss for PIP household services 
benefits requires that the insured "simply . . . show[ that the insured] was disabled...."). 
37
 But see Prince, 2002 UT 68 at ^ 4 ("I do not think that. . ."). Dr. Marble 
apparently "thought" treatment was "excessive." IdL at f^ 23. The legislature considered 
"excessive" treatment and did not permit it as the basis for an exclusion. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 31A-22-307(2)(d) ("Every insurer shall report to the commissioner any pattern 
of overcharging, excessive treatment, or other improper actions by a health provider 
within 30 days after the insurer has knowledge of the pattern.") (emphasis added). 
Patterns affect rate structures; individual treatments do not. 
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feet tall or taller), we can answer "no" to the question "Was the trial 
court correct to find the man 'tall'?" 
Interfaith Community Organization v. Honeywell International Inc.. Nos. 03-
2760/3037/3585 (3rd Cir. February 18, 2005) (concurring) (emphasis added). 
What did the legislature mean when it said that household expenses should be 
"reasonably incurred"?38 Did it mean, as Progressive insists, that a jury should weigh the 
evidence? How could a jury be convened to consider that question within 30 days? How 
would the jury be instructed on the law? 
First, "reasonably incurred" is not relevant because there are two alternative triggers 
of coverage under the household expenses coverage. Plaintiff promised $20 per day to an 
acquaintance to take care of her household. The alternative trigger "actually rendered" was 
fully satisfied in 1997 and not subject to any "reasonable" defense. 
Second, to the extent "reasonably incurred" is to be given effect, the issue is not 
what Progressive, its adjuster or CorVel thinks. The issue is what the legislature meant. 
Issues of statutory construction are not "questions of fact." Statutory construction is a pure 
issue of law. Statutory terms such as "reasonably incurred" may not be interpreted to 
undermine other parts of the statute. The 30 day payment obligation is predominant.39 
38
 See Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1374 (Utah App.), cert denied, 870 P.2d 
957 (Utah 1993) (Orme, J., concurring in the result). The Court must also interpret the 
statute in a reasonable way, with an eye toward the construction that will achieve the best 
results in practical application. See Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
39
 See, e^,, Gassman v. Dorius 543 P.2d 197 (Utah 1975) (Ellet, J. dissenting) 
("There is no provision in the law for any delay."). 
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A contractual defense may be raised by Progressive to avoid its obligations if, and 
only if, the contours of the defense are explicitly delineated in the statutory contract. 
Saying "clear" does not meet that standard. A defense consists of (1) definition; (2) 
elements; (3) burden of proof; (4) quantum of proof; (5) evidentiary presumptions; (6) etc. 
Comparing "reasonable" with "unreasonable" is incomprehensible. It is not a legal 
test. It is not a valid contractual defense. It is not "clear" to a layman, an expert in 
insurance law, or an appellate court judge. Instead, Progressive's assertion is frivolous. 
For example, Progressive advertises its "low" premiums. May an insured refuse to 
pay his premiums when due by saying that: "If I have to pay premiums that are 'low,' then 
it is clear that I don't have to pay premiums that are 'excessive.' As such, Progressive must 
sue me and prove that the premium is 'low' before I have to pay my premium"? One would 
think that Progressive would object to being obligated to provide coverage for six to eight 
years while such a "question of fact" was litigated with made-up-afterward defenses. In 
fact, it would probably call such an argument "frivolous" because it is. And it is exactly the 
same as Progressive's flawed adjudicatory syllogism. 
A rule of law, whether preexisting or newly established, that serves as 
the major premise of an adjudicatory syllogism, necessarily governs 
all subsequent cases properly falling within the scope of the rule. 
This is so even when the particular facts in subsequent cases are 
different and res judicata does not apply. 
Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Tel.. 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992) (emphasis 
added). 
So what is the correct syllogism? Recognizing that Mrs. Martinez is not a 10-year-
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old boy; rather she is a wife of a man with two jobs and the mother of two young children, 
the interplay between the dissent and the majority in Jamison is instructive: 
How would the majority apply its ruling to the following fact situation: 
The mother of five young children is injured. Her husband takes his 
annual vacation and performs the mother's regular household duties. 
As father and husband, he is equally responsible for the care of his 
family. Should the mother recover the statutory allowance? What if 
the family has three healthy teen-age daughters, who suffer from a 
terminal case of laziness? The mother is injured, and the family 
employs someone to clean the house and cook the meals. Should the 
statutory allowance be denied because the daughters should have 
performed these household services? 
Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 559 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1977) (Ellet, J. and 
Maughan, J., dissenting*0). The majority responded as follows: 
The dissent poses questions which are quite different from and 
40
 "This is not an insurance act, per se, but a scheme analogous to the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, wherein the legislature has determined that common law actions and 
principles are inadequate to deal with the social problem. In response to social 
conditions, the legislature has created an entirely new basis to compensate injured 
persons; the Act should be so interpreted without reliance on the concepts of 
traditional tort law." Id at 964. See also United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983) (explaining that the parties' competing interests were 
balanced by the legislative enactment of a two-tiered payment system requiring a 
"definite limitation of $1,283.38 as the maximum award for any 'ordinary' case" and 
"vests the commission with continuing supervision and control, which can be invoked as 
either party may find it necessary, to make determinations as to the causal relationship, 
necessity, reasonableness and justice of any extended award."). Under the no-fault 
statute, by contrast, the legislature left tort law to deal with "extended awards" and 
created PIP benefits to deal with "ordinary" cases. In addition, the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-111, expressly authorizes the use of 
"Utilization Reviews" and the standards applicable thereto are set forth at R612-2-26 of 
the Utah Administrative Code. Utilization reviews have not been adopted for use in the 
no-fault statute. 
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therefore not involved here.[41] But in the interest of avoiding 
misunderstanding, we respond: It would seem that in both examples 
there would be reimbursement. In the first because they are the type of 
services for which the family would reasonably incur expenses; and 
the second because there would be actual expenditures for that type of 
service. Whereas here, we have concluded that the minor tasks done 
by Donald were not things for which the family would have 
"reasonably incurred" expenses by hiring someone else to perform. 
Id at n. 7. While Progressive selectively quotes (Opp. at p. 20) the abstract notion that 
there should not be coverage if there was no loss, it wholly ignores the fact that Mrs. 
Martinez did have a loss (i.e., an actual expenditure and status as mother and wife) and that 
the case it relies on considered the situation presented by this case and both the majority 
and the dissent indicated that such a situation would give rise to a right to receive 
household services benefits — not a "question of fact" to be litigated for eight years in the 
hope that its Mexican insured would give up and go away. See Pugh, 2000 UT App at n. 4. 
Progressive insists that Plaintiff argues in favor of "unnecessary" reimbursement. 
Opp. at 18. To the contrary, Plaintiff argues that there must be standards and criteria lest 
the promise of PIP benefits be illusory. For example, a motorist may not travel at an 
"unreasonable" speed. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-47. This proscription is predicated on an 
objective measure (miles per hour), it delineates time and location (the posted limit on the 
particular stretch of road), it imposes a burden (on the state), and it defines an evidentiary 
presumption {malum prohibitum). Progressive fails to address these fundamental principles 
of jurisprudence. Instead, it underlines words in a fashion that renders its test 
This means that Progressive should not represent that the Jamison case supports 
its position when it actually stands for the opposite of Progressive's position. 
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ungrammatical and unlawful. Such a test only serves, in practice, to eliminate 
Progressive's obligation to perform the contractual promises it made in exchange for a 
premium. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Progressive provided no evidence rebutting Plaintiffs application for 
attorney fees, this Court should enter a judgment in Plaintiffs favor for the fiilly supported 
claim. Moreover, the Court should disabuse Progressive of its belief that it may deny PIP 
claims by simply labeling them "unreasonable and/or unnecessary." Resolution of the 
novel and complex features of this case will simplify future disputes. The Court should 
remand this matter to the Third District Court for reassignment and an award of additional 
attorney fees incurred for this appeal. 
DATED this ^ s day of April, 2005. 
CARR& WADDOUPS 
^RENT J. WADDOUI1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
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HIMmSTfliCTCMiT 
Th'rd Judicial DlsfUct 
M 0 9 233 
Trent J. Waddoups - (Bar No. 7657) 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, L L.C. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
Fax: (801)363-8512 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
IRMA MARTINEZ, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs 
PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN ; 
INSURANCE CO., ; 
Defendant. ) 
) ORDER RE: 
> PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
> TO COMPEL 
) Civil No. 9 7 0 9 0 5 9 3 9 CV 
Judge Ronald E. Nehnng 
The Plaintiff Irma Martinez's Motion to Compel Complete and Non-Evasive 
Responses to Discovery having duly come before the Honorable Ronald E. Nehnng presiding 
at the Third District Court, Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah on Monday, April 14, 2003 at the hour of 9:45 o'clock a.m., Plaintiff Irma 
Martinez being represented by her attorney, Trent J. Waddoups, Defendant Progressive 
Northwestern Insurance Company being represented by its attorney, Kristin VanOrman, the 
Court having reviewed the file, having reviewed the parties' memoranda, having heard the 
arguments of counsel, having reviewed the applicable court rules and legal precedent, being 
fully informed in the premises, and for the reasons set forth by the Court in its ruling from the 
bench, augmented by the agreement of the parties to resolve and settle a portion of their 
underlying disputes and, by necessary implication, to dispose of the collateral discovery 
disputes hereby orders as follows: 
It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that Plaintiff Irma Martinez's Motion to 
Compel Complete and Non-Evasive Responses to Discovery be, and hereby is, granted, in 
part. HOWEVER, this Order is HEREBY STAYED and superseded by the following: 
The following settlement reached by the parties with the assistance of the Court shall 
replace a plenary review of Plaintiff s Motion to Compel and Plaintiffs pending Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. The following stipulation is hereby entered as the Order of the 
Court: 
a. Plaintiff will provide a letter from the employer of Plaintiff at the time of her 
disability indicating the total amount of time she did not work following the April 14, 1997 
and June 8, 1997 accidents and her rate of pay; 
b. Progressive will promptly pay the lost wages for the period set forth in the 
employer's letter at the rate of 85% of her lost gross income or $250.00 per week, whichever 
is lesser; 
c. Progressive will promptly pay the household expenses as previously set forth by 
Plaintiff in her proofs of claim dated July 17, 1997 and September 15, 1997 at the rate of 
2 
$20.00 per day; 
d. Progressive will promptly pay the medical bills incurred as a result of the June 
8, 1997 accident based on the bills it possesses; 
e. Progressive will pay interest accrued at the rate of 1 lA% per month determined 
as simple interest on all payments to be made under ffif b - d, supra, and Plaintiff reserves the 
right to seek judicial clarification of her right to recover normal (a.k.a. compound) interest 
and to recover the difference between simple interest and compound interest if the Court 
rules that the interest provided by section 31 A-22-3 09(5) should be interpreted as normal 
interest; 
f. Plaintiffs entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to section 31 A-22-309(5) will be 
considered separately by the Court upon application by Plaintiffs counsel; and 
g. Progressive agrees that it will not argue or otherwise raise the defense that this 
settlement was "not 'required by the action'" in the future proceedings regarding 
reasonableness of attorney fees pursuant to section 31 A-22-309(5). 
ORDERED this ^ day of AfJril, 2003. 
^
H6NOI8§L p^' RONALD E. I ^ R I N G 
DISTRICT tOURT JUEX&E 
SUBMITTED this Q day ofJAp^ T, 2003. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
TRENT J. WADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Irma Martinez 
AGREED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT this day of April, 2003. 
STRONG &HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant Progressive 
Kristin A. VanOrman 
STRONG & HANN1 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
i ^ v 
CLERK'S MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document to be mailed, postage prepaid, this day of April, 2003, to: 
Ms. Kristin A. VanOrman 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, L.L.C. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
COURT CLERK 
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Exkitit "B" 
Code-Co's Internet Access to Utah Law: http://www.code-co.com 
Code-Co QuickLinks: 
[Home] [Utah Adv.Rep.] [Utah Code] [Legislature] [Ut.Adm.Code] [Courts] [CodeCo] [Subscribe] 
(Utah Adminstrative Code as in effect on January 1, 2000) 
[Search] 
[Utah Administrative Code Table of Contents] 
[Title R590. Table of Contents] 
(R590. Insurance, Administration.) 
R590-190. Unfair Property, Liability and Title 
Claims Settlement Practices Rule. 
R590-190-1 Authority. 
R590-190-2 Purpose. 
R590-190-3 Definitions. 
R590-190-4 File and Record Documentation. 
R590-190-5 Misrepresentation of Policy Provisions. 
R590-190-6 Failure to Acknowledge Pertinent Communications. 
R590-J9(t7 Notice of Claim or Loss. 
R590-190-8 Proof of Loss. 
R590-190-9 Unfair Methods, Deceptive Acts and Practices Defined. 
R590-190-10 Minimum Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements. 
R590-190-11 Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements Applicable to Automobile Insurance. 
R590-190-12 Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Applicable to Automobile Insurance. 
R590-190-13 Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements Applicable to Fire and Extended Coverage Type 
Policies with Replacement Cost Coverage. 
R590-190-14 Severability. 
R590-190-1 Authority, 
This rule is promulgated pursuant to Subsections 31A-2-201 (1) and 31A-2-201 (3)(a) in which the 
commissioner is empowered to administer and enforce this title and to make rules to implement the 
provisions of this title. Further authority to provide for timely payment of claims is provided by 
Subsection 31A-26-301 (1). Matters relating to proof and notice of loss are promulgated pursuant to 
Section 31A-26-301 and Subsection 31A-21-312 (5). Authority to promulgate rules defining unfair 
claims settlement practices or acts is provided in Subsection 31A-26-303 (4). The authority to require a 
timely response to the Insurance Department is provided in Section 31A-2-204. 
R590-190-2 Purpose. 
This rule sets forth minimum standards for the investigation and disposition of property, liability, and 
title claims arising under contracts or certificates issued to residents of the State of Utah. It is not 
intended to cover bail bonds. These standards include fair and rapid settlement of claims, protection for 
claimants under insurance policies from unfair claims adjustment practices and promotion of 
professional competence of those engaged in claim adjusting. This rule defines procedures and practices 
which constitute unfair claim practices. This rule is regulatory in nature and is not intended to create any 
private right of action. 
R590-190-3 Definitions. 
For the purpose of this rule the commissioner adopts the definitions as set forth in 31A-1-301 , and the 
following: 
(1) "Claim file" means any record either in its original form or as recorded by any process which can 
accurately and reliably reproduce the original material regarding the claim, its investigation, adjustment 
and settlement. 
(2) "Claimant" means either a first party claimant, a third party claimant, or both and includes such 
claimant's designated legal representative and includes a member of the claimant's immediate family 
designated by the claimant. 
(3) "Claim representative" means any individual, corporation; association, organization, partnership, or 
other legal entity authorized to represent an insurer with respect to a claim, whether or not licensed 
within the State of Utah to do so. 
(4) "Days" means calendar days. 
(5) "Documentation" includes, but is not limited to, any pertinent communications, transactions, notes, 
work papers, claim forms, bills, and explanation of benefits forms relative to the claim. 
(6) "First party claimant" means an individual, corporation, association, partnership or other legal entity 
asserting a right to a benefit or a payment under an insurance policy or insurance contract arising out of 
the occurrence of the contingency or loss covered by such policy or contract and includes such 
claimant's designated legal representative and includes a member of the claimant's immediate family 
designated by the claimant. 
(7) "General business practice" means a pattern of conduct. 
(8) "Investigation" means all activities of an insurer directly or indirectly related to the determination of 
liabilities under coverages afforded by an insurance policy or insurance contract. 
(9) "Notice of claim or loss" means any notification, whether in writing or other means acceptable under 
the terms of an insurance policy or insurance contract, to an insurer or its agent, by a claimant, which 
reasonably apprizes the insurer of the facts pertinent to a claim. 
(10) "Proof of loss" shall mean reasonable documentation by the insured in accordance with policy 
provisions and insurer practices as to the facts of the loss and the amount of the claim. 
(11) "Specific disclosure" shall mean notice to the insured by means of policy provisions in boldface 
type or a separate written notice mailed or delivered to the insured. 
(12) "Third party claimant" means any person asserting a claim against any person under a policy or 
certificate of an insurer. 
R590-190-4 File and Record Documentation. 
Each insurer's claim files for policies or certificates are subject to examination by the commissioner of 
insurance or by the commissioner's duly appointed designees. To aid in such examination: 
(1) the insurer shall maintain claim data that is accessible and retrievable for examination; and 
(2) detailed documentation shall be contained in each claim file to permit reconstruction of the insurer's 
activities relative to the claim. 
R590-190-5 Misrepresentation of Policy Provisions. 
(1) The insurer and its representatives shall fully disclose to first party claimants all pertinent benefits, 
coverages or other provisions of an insurance policy or insurance contract under which a claim is 
presented, including loss of use and household services. 
(2) The insurer is prohibited from denying a claim based upon a first party claimant's failure to exhibit 
the property unless there is documentation of a breach of the policy provision in the claim file. 
R590-190-6 Failure to Acknowledge Pertinent Communications. 
Within 15-days every insurer shall: 
(1) upon receiving notification of a claim, acknowledge the receipt of such notice unless payment is 
made within such period of time, or unless the insurer has a reason acceptable to the Insurance 
Department as to why such acknowledgment cannot be made within the time specified. Notice given to 
an agent of an insurer is notice to the insurer; 
(2) provide a substantive response to a claimant whenever a response has been requested; and 
(3) upon receiving notification of a claim, provide all necessary claim forms, instructions, and 
reasonable assistance so that first party claimants can comply with the policy conditions and the insurer's 
reasonable requirements. 
R590-190-7 Notice of Claim or Loss. 
(1) Notice of Claim or Loss to an insurer, if required, shall be considered timely if made according to the 
terms of the policy, subject to the definitions and provisions of this rule, and the provisions of Section 
31A-21-312. 
(2) Notice of Claim or Loss may be given by an insured to any appointed agent, authorized adjuster, or 
other authorized claim representative of an insurer unless the insurer clearly directs otherwise by means 
of Specific Disclosure as defined herein. 
(3) The general practice of the insurer when accepting a notice of loss or notice of claim shall be 
consistent for all policyholders in accordance with the terms of the policy. 
R590-190-8 Proof of Loss. 
Proof of loss to an insurer, if required, shall be considered timely if made according to the terms of the 
policy, subject to the definitions and provisions of this rule and the requirements of Section 31A-21-312. 
R590-190-9 Unfair Methods, Deceptive Acts and Practices Defined. 
The commissioner, pursuant to Section 31A-26-303 (4), hereby finds the following acts, or the failure to 
perform required acts, to be misleading, deceptive, unfairly discriminatory or overreaching in the 
settlement of claims: 
(1) denying or threatening the denial of the payment of claims or rescinding, canceling or threatening the 
recission or cancellation of coverage under a policy for any reason which is not clearly described in the 
policy as a reason for such denial, cancellation or rescission; 
(2) failing to provide the insured or beneficiary with a written explanation of the evidence of any 
investigation or file materials giving rise to the denial of a claim based on misrepresentation or fraud on 
an insurance application, when such misrepresentation is the basis for the denial; 
(3) compensation by an insurer of its employees, agents or contractors of any amounts which are based 
on savings to the insurer as a result of denying the payment of claims; 
(4) failing to deliver a copy of the insurer's guidelines, which could include the department's statutes, 
rules and bulletins, for prompt investigation of claims to the Insurance Department when requested to do 
so; 
(5) refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation; 
(6) offering first party claimants substantially less than the reasonable value of the claim. Such value 
may be established by one or more independent sources; 
(7) making claim payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompanied by a statement or explanation 
of benefits setting forth the coverage under which the payments are being made and how the payment 
amount was calculated; 
(8) failing to pay claims within 3 0-day s of properly executed proof of loss when liability is reasonably 
clear under one coverage in order to influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy 
coverage or under other policies of insurance; 
(9) refusing payment of a claim solely on the basis of an insured's request to do so unless: 
(a) the insured claims sovereign, eleemosynary, diplomatic, military service, or other immunity from 
suit or liability with respect to such claim; or 
(b) the insured is granted the right under the policy of insurance to consent to settlement of claims. 
(10) advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney or suggesting the claimant will receive 
less money if an attorney is used to pursue or advise on the merits of a claim; 
(11) misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations; 
(12) requiring an insured to sign a release that extends beyond the occurrence or cause of action that 
gave rise to the claims payment; 
(13) deducting from a loss or claim payment made under one policy those premiums owed by the 
insured on another policy, unless the insured consents; 
(14) failing to settle a first party claim on the basis that responsibility for payment of the claim should be 
assumed by others, except as may otherwise be provided by policy provisions; 
(15) issuing checks or drafts in partial settlement of a loss or a claim under a specified coverage when 
such check or draft contains language which purports to release the insurer or its insured from total 
liability; 
(16) refusing to provide a written basis for the denial of a claim upon demand of the insured; 
(17) denying a claim for medical treatment after preauthorization has been given, except in cases where 
the insurer obtains and provides to the claimant documentation of the pre-existence of the condition for 
which the preauthorization has been given or if the claimant is not eligible for coverage; 
(18) refusing to pay reasonably incurred expenses to an insured when such expenses resulted from a 
delay, as prohibited by these rules, in claims settlement or claims payment; 
(19) when an automobile insurer represents both a tort feasor and a claimant: 
(a) failing to advise a claimant under any coverage that the same insurance company represents both the 
tort feasor and the claimant as soon as such information becomes known to the insurer; and 
(b) allocating medical payments to the tort feasor's liability coverage before exhausting a claimant's 
personal injury protection coverage. 
(20) failing to pay interest at the legal rate, as provided in Title 15, Utah Code, upon amounts that are 
overdue under these rules. This does not apply to insurers who fail to pay Personal Injury Protection 
expenses when due. These expenses shall bear interest as provided in 31A-22-309 (5)(c). 
R590-190-10 Minimum Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements. 
(1) The insurer shall provide to the claimant a statement of the time and manner in which any claim 
must be made and the type of proof of loss required by the insurer. 
(2) Within 3 0-day s after receipt by the insurer of a properly executed proof of loss, the insurer shall 
complete its investigation of the claim and the first party claimant shall be advised of the acceptance or 
denial of the claim by the insurer unless the investigation cannot be reasonably completed within that 
time. If the insurer needs more time to determine whether a first party claim should be accepted or 
denied, it shall so notify the first party claimant within 3 0-day s after receipt of the proofs of loss, giving 
the reasons more time is needed. If the investigation remains incomplete, the insurer shall, within 45-
days after sending the initial notification and within every 45-days thereafter, send to the first party 
claimant a letter setting forth the reasons additional time is needed for the investigation, unless the first 
party claimant is represented by legal counsel or public adjuster. Any basis for the denial of a claim shall 
be noted in the insurers claim file and must be communicated promptly and in writing to the first party 
claimant. Insurers are prohibited from denying a claim on the grounds of a specific provision, condition, 
or exclusion unless reference to such provision, condition or exclusion is included in the denial. 
(3) Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall promptly pay every valid insurance claim. A 
claim shall be overdue if not paid within 3 0-day s after the insurer is furnished written proof of the fact 
of a covered loss and of the amount of the loss. Payment shall mean actual delivery or mailing of the 
amount owed. If such written proof is not furnished to the insurer as to the entire claim, any partial 
amount supported by written proof or investigation is overdue if not paid within 30-days. Payments are 
not deemed overdue when the insurer has reasonable evidence to establish that the insurer is not 
responsible for the payment, notwithstanding that written proof has been furnished to the insurer. 
(4) If negotiations are continuing for settlement of a claim with a claimant, who is not represented by 
legal counsel or public adjuster, notice of expiration of the statute of limitation or contract time limit 
shall be given to the claimant at least 60 days before the date on which such time limit may expire. 
(5) Insurers are prohibited from making statements which indicate that the rights of a third party 
claimant may be impaired if a form or release is not completed within a given period of time unless the 
statement is given for the purpose of notifying the third party claimant of the provision of a statute of 
limitations. 
(6) Upon receipt of an inquiry from the insurance department regarding a claim, every licensee shall 
furnish a substantive response to the insurance department within the time period specified in the 
inquiry. 
R590-190-11 Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements Applicable to Automobile 
Insurance. 
(1) When the insurance policy provides for the adjustments and settlement of automobile total losses for 
first party claimants on the basis of actual cash value or replacement with another of like kind and 
quality, one of the following methods must apply: 
(a) the insurer may elect to offer a replacement automobile which is a specific comparable automobile 
available to the insured, with all applicable taxes, license fees and other fees incident to transfer of 
evidence of ownership of the automobile paid, at no cost other than any deductible provided in the 
policy. The offer and any rejection thereof must be documented in the claim file; 
(b) the insurer may elect a cash settlement based upon the actual cost, less any deductible provided in 
the policy, to purchase a comparable automobile including all applicable taxes, license fees and other 
fees incident to transfer of evidence of ownership of a comparable automobile. Such cost may be 
determined by using: 
(i) the cost of two or more comparable automobiles in the local market area when a comparable 
automobile is available or was available within the last 90-days to consumers in the local market area; 
(ii) the cost of two or more comparable automobiles in areas proximate to the local market area, 
including the closest major metropolitan areas within or without the state, that are available or were 
available within the last 90-days to consumers when comparable automobiles are not available in the 
local market area pursuant to Subsection R590-190-11.(1 )(b)(i); 
(iii) one of two or more quotations obtained by the insurer from two or more qualified dealers located 
within the local market area when a comparable automobile is not available in the local market area; or 
(iv) any source of determining statistically valid fair market values that meet all of the following criteria: 
(A) the source shall give primary consideration to the values of vehicles in the local market area and 
may consider data on vehicles outside the area; 
(B) the source's database shall produce values for at least 85% of the makes and models for the last 15 
model years, taking into account the values of all major options for such vehicles; and 
(C) the source shall produce fair market values based on current data available from the area 
surrounding the location where the insured vehicle was principally garaged or a necessary expansion of 
parameters, such as time and area, to assure statistical validity. 
(v) if the insurer is notified within 3 0-day s of the receipt of the claim draft that the first party claimant 
cannot purchase a comparable vehicle for such market value, the company shall reopen its claim file and 
the following procedure(s) shall apply: 
(A) the company may locate a comparable vehicle by the same manufacturer, same year, similar body 
style and similar options and price range for the insured for the market value determined by the 
company at the time of settlement. Any such vehicle must be available through licensed dealers or 
private sellers; 
(B) the company shall either pay the difference between market value before applicable deductions and 
the cost of the comparable vehicle of like kind and quality which the insured has located, or negotiate 
and effect the purchase of this vehicle for the insured; 
(C) the company may elect to offer a replacement in accordance with the provisions set forth in 
Subsection R590-190-11.(1 )(a); or 
(D) the company may conclude the loss settlement as provided for under the appraisal section of the 
insurance contract in force at the time of the loss. The company is not required to take action under this 
subsection if its documentation to the first party claimant, at the time of settlement, included written 
notification of the availability and location of a specified and comparable vehicle of the same 
manufacturer, same year, similar body style and similar options in as good or better condition as the 
total loss vehicle which could be purchased for the market value determined by the company before 
applicable deductions. 
(c) when a first party claimant automobile total loss is settled on a basis which deviates from the 
methods described in Subsections R590-190-11.(1 )(a) and (b), the deviation must be supported by 
documentation giving particulars of the automobile condition. Any deductions from such cost, including 
deductions for salvage, must be measurable, itemized and specified as to dollar amount and shall be 
appropriate in amount. The basis for such settlement shall be fully explained to the first party claimant. 
(2) Total loss settlements with a third party claimant shall be on the basis of the market value or actual 
cost of a comparable automobile at the time of loss. Settlement procedures shall be in accordance with 
Subsection R590-190-11.(1 )(b) and (c), except (b)(v) shall not apply. 
(3) Where liability and damages are reasonably clear, insurers are prohibited from recommending that 
third party claimants make a claim under their own policies solely to avoid paying claims under such 
insurer's insurance policy or insurance contract. 
(4) Insurers are prohibited from requiring a claimant to travel an unreasonable distance to inspect a 
replacement automobile, to obtain a repair estimate or to have the automobile repaired at a specific 
repair shop. 
(5) Insurers shall include the first party claimant's deductible, if any, in subrogation demands initiated by 
the insurer. Subrogation recoveries may be shared on a proportionate basis with the first party claimant 
when an agreement is reached for less than the full amount of the loss, unless the deductible amount has 
been otherwise recovered. The recovery shall be applied first to reimburse the first party claimant for the 
amount or share of the deductible when the full amount or share of the deductible has been recovered. 
No deduction for expenses can be made from the deductible recovery unless an outside attorney is 
retained to collect such recovery. The deduction may then be for only a pro rata share of the allocated 
loss adjustment expense. If subrogation is initiated but discontinued, the insured shall be advised. 
(6) If an insurer prepares or approves an estimate of the cost of automobile repairs, such estimate shall 
be in an amount for which it may be reasonably expected the damage can be satisfactorily repaired. If 
the insurer prepares an estimate, it shall give a copy of the estimate to the claimant and may furnish to 
the claimant the names of one or more conveniently located repair shops. 
(7) When the amount claimed is reduced because of betterment or depreciation, all information for such 
reduction shall be contained in the claim file. Such deductions shall be itemized and specified as to 
dollar amount and shall be appropriate for the amount of deductions. The insurer shall provide a written 
explanation of these deductions to the claimant upon request. 
(8) When the insurer elects to repair and designates a specific repair shop for automobile repairs, the 
insurer shall cause the damaged automobile to be restored to its condition prior to the loss at no 
additional cost to the claimant other than as stated in the policy and within a reasonable period of time. 
(9) Where coverage exists, loss of use payment shall be made to a claimant for the reasonably incurred 
cost of transportation, or for the reasonably incurred rental cost of a substitute vehicle, including 
collision damage waiver, unless the claimant has physical damage coverage available, during the period 
the automobile is necessarily withdrawn from service to obtain parts or effect repair, or, in the event the 
automobile is a total loss and the claim has been timely made, during the period from the date of loss 
until a reasonable settlement offer has been made by the insurer. The insurer is prohibited from refusing 
to pay for loss of use for the period that the insurer is examining the claim or making other 
determinations as to the payability of the loss, unless such delay reveals that the insurer is not liable to 
pay the claim. Loss of use payments shall be an amount in addition to the payment for the value of the 
automobile. 
(10) Subject to Subsections R590-190-11.(1) and (2), an insurer shall fairly, equitably and in good faith 
attempt to compensate a claimant for all losses incurred under collision or comprehensive coverages. 
Such compensation shall be based at least, but not exclusively, upon the following standards: 
(a) an offer of settlement may not be made exclusively on the basis of useful life of the part or vehicle 
damaged; 
(b) an estimate of the amount of compensation for the claimant shall include the actual wear and tear, or 
lack thereof, of the damaged part or vehicle; 
(c) actual cash value, which shall take into account the cost of replacement of the vehicle and/or the part 
for which compensation is claimed; 
(d) an actual estimate of the true useful life remaining in the part or vehicle shall be taken into account in 
establishing the amount of compensation of a claim; and 
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(e) actual cash value, which shall include taxes and other fees which shall be incurred by a claimant in 
replacing the part or vehicle or in compensating the claimant for the loss incurred. 
(11) Insurers are prohibited from demanding reimbursement of personal injury protection payments 
from a first-party insured of payments received by that party from a settlement or judgement against a 
third party, except as provided by law. 
(12) The insurer shall provide reasonable written notice to a claimant prior to termination of payment for 
automobile storage charges and documentation of the denial as required by Section R590-190-4. Such 
insurer shall provide reasonable time for the claimant to remove the vehicle from storage prior to the 
termination of payment. 
R590-190-12 Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Applicable to Automobile Insurance. 
The commissioner, pursuant to Section 31A-26-303 (4), hereby finds the following acts, or the failure to 
perform required acts, to be misleading, deceptive, unfairly discriminatory or overreaching in the 
settlement of claims: 
(1) using as a basis for cash settlement with a claimant an amount which is less than the amount which 
the insurer would be charged if repairs were made, unless such amount is agreed to by the claimant or 
provided for by the insurance policy; 
(2) refusing to settle a claim based solely upon the issuance of, or failure to, issue a traffic citation by a 
police agency; 
(3) failing to disclose all coverages for which an application for benefits is required by the insurer; 
(4) failing in good faith to disclose all coverages, including loss of use, household services, and any 
other coverages available to the claimant; 
(5) requiring a claimant to use only the insurer's claim service in order to perfect a claim; 
(6) failing to furnish the claimant, when requested, with the name and address of the salvage dealer who 
has provided a salvage quote for the amount deducted by the insurer in a total loss settlement; 
(7) refusing to disclose policy limits when requested to do so by a claimant or claimant's attorney; 
(8) using a release on the back of a check or draft which requires a claimant to release the company from 
obligation on further claims in order to process a current claim when the company knows or reasonably 
should know that there will be future liability on the part of the insurer; 
(9) refusing to use a separate release of a claim document rather than one on the back of a check or draft 
when requested to do so by a claimant; 
(10) intentionally offering less money to a first party claimant than the claim is reasonably worth, a 
practice referred to as "low-balling;" 
(11) refusing to offer to pay claims based upon the Doctrine of Comparative Negligence without a 
reasonable basis for doing so; and 
(12) imputing the negligence of a permissive user of a vehicle to the owner of the vehicle in a bailment 
situation. 
R590-190-13 Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements Applicable to Fire and 
Extended Coverage Type Policies with Replacement Cost Coverage. 
(1) Replacement Cost Value: 
When the policy provides for the adjustment and settlement of first party losses based on replacement 
cost, the following shall apply: 
(a) when a loss requires repair or replacement of an item or part, any consequential physical damage 
incurred in making such repair or replacements not otherwise excluded by the policy, shall be included 
in the loss. The insured is only responsible for the applicable deductible; and 
(b) when a loss requires replacement or repair of items and the repaired or replaced items do not match 
in color, texture, or size, the insurer shall repair or replace items so as to conform to a reasonably 
uniform appearance. This applies to interior and exterior losses. The insured is only responsible for the 
applicable deductible. 
(2) Actual Cash Value: 
(a) When the insurance policy provides for the adjustment and settlement of losses on an actual cash 
value basis on residential fire and extended coverage, the insurer shall determine actual cash value as the 
replacement cost of property at the time of the loss less depreciation, if any. Upon the insured's request, 
the insurer shall provide a copy of relevant documentation from the claim file detailing any and all 
deductions for depreciation. 
(b) In cases in which the insured's interest is limited because the property has nominal or no economic 
value, or a value disproportionate to replacement cost less depreciation, the determination of actual cash 
value, as set forth above, is not required. In such cases, the insurer shall provide, upon the insured's 
request, a written explanation of the basis for limiting the amount of recovery along with the amount 
payable under the policy. 
R590-190-14 Severability. 
If any provision or clause of this rule or its application to any person or situation is held invalid, such 
invalidity may not affect any other provision or application of this rule which can be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this rule are declared to be 
severable. 
[Indexing] KEY: insurance law 
July 28, 1999 
[Editor's note: Below are references to the Utah Code that are listed by the agency making this rule as 
authority for the rule.] 
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Trent J. Waddoups - (Bar No. 7657) 
CARR & WADDOUPS , t i f /?( 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-0888 
Fax: (801)363-8512 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
IRMA MARTINEZ, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN ; 
INSURANCE CO., ] 
Defendant. ) 
> VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR 
> AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
1
 AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 
1
 Civil No. 9 7 0 9 0 5 9 3 9 CV 
Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
§ 
) 
Trent J. Waddoups, upon being sworn, duly acknowledges as follows: 
1. Your affiant affirms that the Plaintiff is entitled to include attorney fees expended 
in pursuing its cause of action against Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co. for failure to 
pay PIP expenses in a timely manner as a measure of damages against Progressive 
Northwestern pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-309(5)(d) and as set forth by the Court 
in its oral ruling on April 14, 2003 as being those hours related to the contract cause of 
action, the entry of Judge Nehring's order granting Plaintiffs motion to compel complete and 
non-evasive responses to discovery and Progressive's payment of the remainder of its 
contractual obligations, but excluding hours spent on causes of action other than the breach 
of the statutory contract. 
2. The hours expended in this matter are set forth below: 
RATE DATE ACTIVITY TOTAL 
HOURS HOURS 
1 $150.00 June 25, 1997 
2 $150.00 June 26, 1997 
3 $150.00 June 26, 1997 
4 $150.00 June 30,1997 
5 $150.00 June 30, 1997 
6 $150.00 June 30, 1997 
7 $150.00 July 2, 1997 
8 $150.00 July 3, 1997 
9 $150.00 July 10, 1997 
Representation letter to Progressive 
Insurance 
0.50 0.50 
2 letter to Progressive asking for client file 0.40 
Discussed "IME" issue with client 
Reviewed acknowledgment letter from 
Progressive Insurance 
1.00 
0.30 
Reviewed letter regarding wage benefits for 0.30 
Irma 
Reviewed and discussed the letter with Irma 0.80 
from State Farm Insurance to Irma regarding 
that accident on April 14, 1997 
Reviewed letter from Progressive to Dennis 0.60 
D.Theon regarding the PIP limits and that 
they have been exhausted 
Sent out copies of Wasatch Endoscopy 
Center bill to Progressive 
Reviewed letter from Progressive stating that 0.50 
they have closed their PIP file 
0.40 
1.00 
0.30 
0.30 
0.80 
0.60 
0.30 0.30 
0.50 
2 
10 $150.00 July 15, 1997 
11 $150.00 July 17, 1997 
12 $150.00 July 28, 1997 
13 $150.00 July 30, 1997 
14 $150.00 July 31, 1997 
15 $150.00 August 1, 
1997 
16 $150.00 August 1, 
1997 
17 $150.00 August 4, 
1997 
18 $150.00 August 5, 
1997 
19 $150.00 August 7, 
1997 
20 $150.00 August 7, 
1997 
0.30 
0.60 
0.40 
Reviewed letter from Progressive to Dr. 0.30 
Douglas requesting medical records 
Sent out copies of Dr.'s authorization for 
absence to Progressive 
Prepared letter to Progressive stating that 
they will pay the PIP expenses of Irma 
Reviewed letter from Progressive along with 
photos. Waiting for medical records and 
then CorVel will be notified for an 
appointment 
research Utah PIP cases (no cases 7.70 
interpreting purported "reasonable and 
necessary" requirement) and applicability to 
Progressive's assertions 
visit law library for law reviews (primarily 3.50 
Keeton's 1973 Utah Law Review article) and 
secondary sources 
review article I section 11 jurisprudence 3.80 
related to interpretation of no-fault statute 
(primarily Warren v. Melville and Malan v. 
Lewis) 
TJW: Conference Carmen Doyle and 0.30 
supervisor regarding payment of PIP benefits 
Prepared letter to Progressive regarding the 0.80 
PIP expenses and clients policy 
Review seminal insurance coverage cases 4.00 
(primarily Beck, Crookston, and Versluis) 
Research duties of insurers under PIP 2.50 
coverage (primarily Ivie, Jamison, Brundage, 
Warren); Get Rich Humphries Article on 
duties 
0.30 
0.30 
0.60 
0.40 
7.70 
3.50 
3.80 
0.30 
0.80 
4.00 
2.50 
3 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
$150.00 
$150.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
August 7, 
1997 
August 8, 
1997 
August 11, 
1997 
August 11, 
1997 
August 19, 
1997 
August 25, 
1997 
August 25, 
1997 
September 4, 
1997 
September 9, 
1997 
September 9, 
1997 
September 15, 
1997 
September 16, 
1997 
Research confidential relationship cases re 
burden of proving exclusions and 
presumption of fraud 
Research; Find e.g. Jones v. Transamerica; 
Write new Complaint 
Meet with client and explain representation 
against Progressive and hourly rate 
applicable to further action: $500.00 per 
hour. 
Research Attorney Fee issue (cannot bill a 
third for PIP) 
Prepared Complaint 
3.00 0.00 
6.00 
2.00 
2.00 
3.00 
Reviewed letter from Progressive asking for 0.20 
medical documents 
Reviewed letter to Irma from Progressive 0.20 
with a check in the amount of $550.00 for 
lost wages 
Filed with the court Service of Process 0.10 
Research physician patient relationship (find, 1.50 
e.g., Mikkelsen v. Haslam) 
Research foreign state law (e.g., Dibassie 6.00 
finding doctor's bill is "reasonable proof for 
PIP benefits purposes in Kansas) 
Spoke with Irma regarding the letter and the 0.60 
amount that Progressive paid 
Research employment law interpretations of 5.00 
Beck's contract interpretation analysis (e.g. 
Peterson v. Browning) 
6.00 
2.00 
2.00 
3.00 
0.20 
0.20 
0.10 
1.50 
6.00 
0.60 
5.00 
4 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
September 26, 
1997 
September 26, 
1997 
October 1, 
1997 
October 15, 
1997 
October 17, 
1997 
October 17, 
1997 
October 17, 
1997 
October 23, 
1997 
October 23, 
1997 
November 4, 
1997 
November 26, 
1997 
November 26, 
1997 
Reviewed letter from Joseph Joyce, Attorney 0.30 0 
for Progressive 
Prepared letter to Progressive requesting that 0.40 0 
they pay the remained of the PIP expenses 
Reviewed letter from Progressive stating that 0.20 0 
they have retained counsel and that we have 
granted them an extension to answer 
complaint 
Prepared letter to Irma, Written in Spanish 0.50 0 
Reviewed Amended Answer 0.80 0 
Reviewed Defendant's First Set of 0.50 0 
Interrogatories to Plaintiff 
Translated Interrogatories into Spanish 2.00 2 
visit law library to read full foreign cases 6.00 6 
cited by opposition and research underlying 
structure of no-fault statutes for those states 
and other prominent states 
research unilateral contracts and unilateral 1.40 1 
interpretation of conditions 
Reviewed letter from Progressive 0.30 0 
Prepared letter to Joseph Joyce asking for an 0.30 0 
extension of time to answer Interrogatories 
Prepared Ex-Parte Application and Order for 0.30 0 
Leave to File and Over-Length 
Memorandum 
5 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
November 26, 
1997 
December 29, 
1997 
January 9, 
1998 
January 9, 
1998 
January 30, 
1998 
February 4, 
1998 
February 4, 
1998 
February 11, 
1998 
February 24, 
1998 
March 3, 1998 
Prepared Memorandum of Points and 9 
Authorities of Plaintiff s Motion for 
Summary Judgment; Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Request for Hearing 
Reviewed Defendant's Memorandum in 1 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
Prepared Reply Memorandum in Support of 4 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Prepared Notice to Submit for Decision 0 
Reviewed Defendant's Memorandum in 0 
Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
Research and prepare standard of review for 2 
Progressive's frivolous assertion that it was 
entitled to a summary judgment because it 
had "no evidence" 
Additional research on the point that it is 3 
impossible to say that actions were "fairly 
debatable" without knowing what actions 
should have taken 
Meeting with Irma, for medical release form 0 
Prepared Memorandum of Points and 2 
Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and 
Notice of Hearing 
Reviewed Notice of Continuance for 0 
Hearing of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
6 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
March 25, 
1998 
March 26, 
1998 
March 30, 
1998 
March 31, 
1998 
April 1, 1998 
April 6, 1998 
May 5, 1998 
June 17,1998 
July 14, 1998 
August 5, 
1998 
October 2, 
1998 
November 2, 
1998 
November 3, 
1998 
November 3, 
1998 
Prepared letter to Court for Courtesy Copies 0 
Reviewed Reply Memorandum in Support of 0 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Reviewed fax letter from Joseph Joyce 
Prepared and Attended Hearing 
Reviewed Notice of Hearing 
Reviewed Notice of Reassignment 
Prepared letter to Dr. Black requesting 
medical records 
Prepared letter to Dr. Black asking for a 
narrative report discussing his diagnosis 
Prepared fax letter to Progressive regarding a 
judgment lien 
Prepared Notice of Hearing for Plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Prepared letter to Dr. Wapner, asking for a 
narrative report discussing his diagnosis 
Prepared Plaintiffs Responses to 
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories 
Prepared letter to court along with Courtesy 
Copies for the Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment 
Prepared Addendum to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
S500.00 
November 3, 
1998 
November 6, 
1998 
November 24, 
1998 
November 30, 
1998 
December 2, 
1998 
January 6, 
1999 
January 8, 
1999 
January 14, 
1999 
January 16, 
1999 
January 22, 
1999 
January 26, 
1999 
January 27, 
1999 
February 5, 
1999 
Research and preparation for Trial Brief 
Prepared and attended Hearing for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
Reviewed letter from Kristin VanOrman 
from Strong and Hanni regarding Order 
Prepared fax letter regarding Order and 
changes that needed to be made 
Reviewed Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Paid for Bond 
Prepared Notice of Appeal and Notice of 
Bond for Costs on Appeal 
Reviewed letter from Supreme Court 
notifying that appeal has been received 
Prepared Request for Transcript 
Reviewed Transcript of Hearing 
Prepared Irma Martinez Docketing 
Statement 
Reviewed letter from Supreme Court asking 
to re-submit Docketing Statement 
Prepared Addendum to Docketing Statement 
4.00 
3.50 
0.20 
0.50 
0.50 
3 
0 
0 
0 
March 8, 1999 Reviewed Supreme Court Order 
0.30 
0.40 
0.40 
0.30 
2.00 
1.00 
0.30 
1.80 
0.40 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
8 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
April 9, 1999 
February 10, 
2000 
February 10, 
2000 
March 10, 
2000 
March 24, 
2000 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500 00 
April 11,2000 
April 13, 2000 
September 14, 
2000 
November 8, 
2000 
November 8, 
2000 
November 9, 
2000 
November 9, 
2000 
Reviewed Order of Dismissal 
Prepared Plaintiffs First Set of Request for 
Admission, Interrogatories, and Request for 
Production of Documents 
Prepared letter to Joseph Joyce regarding 
settlement 
Reviewed Defendant's 2nd Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production 
of Documents, translated into Spanish for 
Plaintiff 
Reviewed Faxed information form Allstate 
in which Allstate learned that Progressive 
had reported 2nd accident to the CLUE 
system (in which Mrs. Martinez was rear-
ended) as an "at fault" accident preventing 
them from being able to be insured. 
Reviewed Withdrawal of Defendant's 
Motion to Compel 
Reviewed letter form Kristin VanOrman 
Prepared Authorization to Represent, Issue 
Class Action Lawsuit 
Prepared letter to Kristin VanOrman 
regarding interrogatories 
Prepared Plaintiffs Responses to 
"Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories 
and Request for Production of Documents" 
Reviewed Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Compel 
Prepared Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Request for 
Hearing; Research 
0.30 
2.50 
0.20 
1.30 
0.30 
2.50 
0.20 
1.30 
0.30 0.30 
0.20 0.20 
0.20 
0.80 
0.30 
2.60 
0.40 
4.60 
0.20 
0.00 
0.30 
2.60 
0.40 
4.60 
9 
95 $500.00 November 9, Prepared Amended Complaint 3.00 0.00 
2000 
96 $500.00 November 9, Prepared Memorandum in Support of 1.00 0.00 
2000 Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Plaintiffs 
Complaint 
97 $500.00 November 9, Prepared Plaintiff s Ex-Parte Application fro 0.40 0.00 
2000 the Filing of an Over-Length Memorandum 
98 $500.00 November 9, Reviewed letter from Kristin VanOrman 0.30 0.30 
2000 regarding discovery 
99 $500.00 November 10, Prepared letter to Court 0.20 0.20 
2000 
100 $500.00 November 9, Prepared Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points 6.70 6.70 
2000 and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
101 $500.00 November 22, Reviewed Memorandum in Opposition to 0.70 0.70 
2000 Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Amend the 
Complaint 
102 $500.00 November 27, Prepared Plaintiff s Responses to 1.80 1.80 
2000 "Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories 
and Request for Production of Documents" 
103 $500.00 November 29, Reviewed Notice to Submit 0.20 0.20 
2000 
104 $500.00 November 30, Prepared Memorandum in Opposition to 1.30 1.30 
2000 Defendant's Motion to Compel 
105 $500.00 December 1, Prepared Memorandum in Support of 1.50 1.50 
2000 Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Complete and 
Non-Evasive Responses to Discovery 
10 
106 $500.00 December 4, 
2000 
107 $500.00 December 13, 
2000 
108 $500.00 December 22, 
2000 
109 $500.00 December 22, 
2000 
110 $500.00 December 22, 
2000 
111 $500.00 January 8, 
2001 
112 $500.00 January 15, 
2001 
113 $500.00 January 30, 
2001 
114 $500.00 January 31, 
2001 
115 $500.00 February 1, 
2001 
Prepared Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in 7 
Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment; Prepared Plaintiffs Ex-
Parte Application for the Filing of an Over-
Length Memorandum 
Reviewed Defendant's Memorandum in 0 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
Prepared Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in 1 
Support of Plaintiff s Motion to Compel 
Complete and Non-Evasive Responses to 
Discovery 
Prepared Reply Memorandum in Support of 3 
Motion to Amend Plaintiffs Complaint 
Prepared letter to Court 0 
Reviewed Minute Entry 0 
Reviewed letter, and Order Granting 0 
Defendant's Motion to Compel 
Reviewed Memorandum in Support of 0 
Motion to Dismiss 
Prepared Notice to Submit for Decision 0 
Prepared Plaintiffs Supplemental Responses 1 
to "Defendant's Second Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production 
of Documents" 
116 $500.00 February 1, 
2001 
Prepared Affidavit of Trent J. Waddoups 0 
11 
117 $500.00 February 1, Prepared Plaintiff s Memorandum of Points 5.00 5.00 
2001 and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Regarding the Requirement of "Reasonable 
and Necessary" 
118 $500.00 March 8,2001 Reviewed Minute Entry 0.30 0.30 
119 $500.00 March 15, Reviewed Notice to Submit 0.20 0.20 
2001 
120 $500.00 July 9,2001 Reviewed Minute Entry 0.50 0.50 
121 $500.00 July 11, 2001 Reviewed Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion 0.40 0.40 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion 
to Amend 
122 $500.00 July 25, 2001 Prepared Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's 1.80 1.80 
Proposed Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion for a 
Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to 
Amend and Request for Pretrial Conference 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
December 20, 
2002 
January 22, 
2003 
January 23, 
2003 
January 31, 
2003 
February 19, 
2003 
February 20, 
2003 
Reviewed Offer of Judgment 
Reviewed Request for Scheduling 
Conference 
Called Irma to set up a date and time to have 
her deposition taken and to give status of 
case 
Reviewed Notice of Deposition 
Prepared Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: 
Liability for PIP Household Expenses 
Prepared letter to court 
0.30 
0.20 
0.50 
0.20 
2.50 
0.20 
0.30 
0.20 
0.50 
0.20 
2.50 
0.20 
12 
129 $500.00 February 21, Spoke with Kristin VanOrman 0 
2003 
130 $50ftOO February 23, Reviewed letter from Kristin VanOrman 0 
2003 
131 $500.00 February 28, Discussed status of case with Client 0 
2003 
132 $500.00 March 19, Prepared Second Notice to Submit for 0 
2003 Decision and Request for Hearing 
133 $500.00 March 26, Prepared letter to Irma Martinez 0 
2003 
134 $500.00 April 11,2003 Reviewed Defendant's Memorandum in 0 
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
135 $500.00 April 14,2003 Prepared and Attended Hearing for Partial 3 
Summary Judgment 
136 $500.00 April 15,2003 Reviewed Irma Martinez's payroll 0 
137 $500.00 April 16, 2003 Discussed status of case with client 0 
138 $500.00 April 16, 2003 Prepared Order Re: Plaintiff s Motion to 0 
Compel and forwarded it Krisin VanOrman 
for Review 
139 $500.00 May 6, 2003 Prepared letter to Court regarding Order Re: 0 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
140 $500.00 May 20, 2003 Reviewed letter from Strong & Hanni 0 
regarding the settlement amount excluding 
attorney's fees 
141 $500.00 May 27, 2003 Reviewed Release of All Claims form and 1 
discussed the form with client 
142 $500.00 June 6, 2003 Reviewed letter to Court regarding Motion 0 
and Stipulation to Dismiss and Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice 
13 
TOTAL HOURS 189.80 170.20 
3. The foregoing time was reasonably expended. 
4. The rates charged are reasonable for comparable legal services given the expertise 
required, the risk involved, the unsettled status of the law, and the nature of oppressive, 
stubborn, and vexatious defensive tort-based assertions. 
5. The applicable rates are $150.00 per hour before litigation was begun and $500.00 
per hour thereafter. 
6. The hours spent on the Breach of Contract cause of action are 170.20. 
7. The hours representing work relating to other causes of action for which attorney 
fees would have been recoverable if they had been successful are approximately 12.20. 
8. The hours representing work relating to causes of action for which no attorney 
fees would be available are approximately 7.40. 
9. Plaintiffs attorney fees which are recoverable from Defendant under section 309 
as set forth above are the sum of $72,885.00. 
10. WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that a final judgment be entered against this 
defendant and in favor of plaintiff for an award of attorney fees in the sum of $72,885.00. 
11. Pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration, plaintiff 
hereby requests a hearing on this application. 
14 
DATED this ^ day of December, 2003. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTARY CLAUSE 
On this Q day of December, 2003, personally appeared before me Trent J. 
Waddoups who, being duly sworn, did say that he is an attorney for the Plaintiff named 
herein, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said Plaintiff by him, the foregoing is 
true to the best of his knowledge and belief, and said Trent J. Waddoups acknowledged to me 
that he executed the same. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document to be mailed, postage prepaid, this ,^ day of December, 2003, to: 
Ms. Kristin A. VanOrman 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ExUit "D" 
IRMA MARTINEZ, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
VS 
PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE CO., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
JANUARY 3, 2005 
INDEX 
DISTRICT COURT NO. 970905939 
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 20040799-CA 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
DATE 
FILED DOCUMENT 
PAGE 
NUMBERS 
08/20/97 COMPLAINT 1-9 
09/10/97 SUMMONS 10-11 
10/21/97 AMENDED ANSWER 12-21 
10/21/97 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 22-23 
12/01 /97 MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 24-25 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
12/01/97 EX-PARTE APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR LEAVE TO 26-29 
FILE AN OVER-LENGTH MEMORANDUM 
12/01/97 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 30-83 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
12/31191 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 84-109 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
01/12/98 REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 110-124 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
01/12/98 NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 125-126 
02/02/98 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 127-146 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
02/26/98 NOTICE OF HEARING 147-148 
02/26/98 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 149-177 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
03/05/98 NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE 178-179 
03/26/98 REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 180-188 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Page 1 
IRMA MARTINEZ, 
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Exhibit "E" 
The Recovery of Attorney Fees in Utah: 
A Procedural Primer1 for Practitioners - Part I 
By James E. Magleby 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1984, the University of Utah Law 
Review published a symposium2 which 
summarized the state of Utah law3 on the 
recovery of attorney fees4 which contained 
a brief discussion of the procedural aspects 
af the process.5 Although Utah law on the 
subject has developed substantially since 
1984, the procedural aspects of the recov-
ery of attorney fees are often overlooked 
by courts and practitioners alike.6 Accord-
ingly, this article attempts to reduce the 
confusion by providing an overview of the 
procedural aspects of pleading and recov-
ering attorney fees in Utah and surviving 
appellate challenge to the award.7 
II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 
a. Pleading 
Although it may appear obvious, practi-
tioners have, on occasion, failed to request 
an award of attorney fees in the pleadings. 
Such an omission can have dire conse-
quences, as a party who fails to raise the 
issue of attorney fees until late in the pro-
ceedings may be precluded from 
recovering fees at all. This position was 
first taken in Leger Construction, Inc. v. 
Roberts, Inc.,* where the court declined to 
award attorney fees because the statute 
under which fees were sought was not pled 
in the original pleadings.9 The court noted 
that, at least with regard to a request for 
attorney fees under statutory authority, 
"one entitled [to attorney fees under a 
statute], in fairness, should make his claim 
known in his pleadings."10 Although this 
statement was couched m mere observa-
tion," the rule in practice is that attorney 
fees which are not requested in the plead-
ings will not be awarded.12 
However, if the issue of attorney fees is 
raised before the trial court and the other 
party placed on notice, Utah courts appear 
willing to interpret the rules of procedure 
liberally to allow a fee award. In Palombi v. 
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Coif upon graduation. He was admitted to the 
Utah State Bar in October of1994. 
Jim is the author of Hospital Mergers and 
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cation of Current Antitrust Law, 21 The 
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stitutionality of Utah's Medical Malpractice 
Damages Cap Under the Utah Constitution, 
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consisting of a biographical survey of all past 
and present Utah Supreme Court Justices. 
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brook & McDonough. The focus of his 
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D.C. Builders,13 the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld an award of attorney fees under the 
mechanics lien statute, although the issue had 
not been raised in the original complaint.14 
In doing so, the Supreme Court ruled: 
The fact that there was no specific 
pleading in that regard does not pre-
clude such an award. It is indeed 
important that the issue be raised and 
that the parties have full opportunity 
to meet it. But when that is done, our 
rules indicate that there shall be 
liberality of procedure to reach the 
result which justice requires. Rule 
1(a), [Utah Rules of Civil Procedure], 
provides that they shall be "liberally 
construed" to secure a "just . . . 
determination of every action and 
Rule 54(c)(1) provides " . . . every 
final judgment shall grant the relief 
to which the party . . . is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in his pleadings.15 
Other rules have been construed in similar 
manner to reach similar results. Rule 8(e) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure con-
tains the "notice pleading" rule which 
provides that "no technical forms of plead-
ings or motions are required."16 This rule 
has been applied to allow recovery of attor-
ney fees where the opposing party was 
"clearly on notice" that fees were sought, 
albeit by imperfect pleading." Trial courts 
have discretion to take evidence on attor-
ney fees at trial under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(b),18 even if the parties did 
not raise the issue in the'pleadings.19 Nor 
do the pleadings limit the amount of fees 
recoverable,20 unless they are awarded pur-
suant to a default judgment.21 
From these cases, it appears that where 
a party has failed to request attorney fees 
in the initial pleadings, as long as "the 
issue be raised and. . . the parties have full 
opportunity to meet it,"22 particularly where 
the opposing party is "clearly on notice,"23 
Utah courts will probably allow recovery 
of attorney fees despite a failure to con-
Voi 9 No. 10 
brm to a specific pleading format. There-
ore, a practitioner who has inadvertently 
ailed to plead attorney fees, or is not enti-
led to do so until the case has progressed,24 
hould (1) take steps to bring the issue 
)efore the court and (2) place opposing 
ounsel on notice that fees are an issue. 
In pleading attorney fees, practitioners 
nust decide the grounds upon which attor-
ley fees will be sought, whether they be 
tatutory, contractual or equitable.:> Next, 
he practitioner must decide the appropri-
te method for pleading the grounds upon 
/hich attorney fees are sought. The prac-
ce in Utah varies, with some preferring to 
squest attorney fees in the prayer for 
ilief, rather than as separate claim.26 Intu-
ively, this may make sense as attorney 
*es are usually awarded after the conclu-
lon of the lawsuit,27 in temporal proximity 
) an award of damages. Another approach 
; to plead attorney fees as a separate 
laim.28 This method seems particularly 
ppropriate where the request is based 
pon a statute or other rule which requires 
le party requesting fees to produce proof 
n discrete issues.29 
, Burden of Proof 
Once recovery of attorney fees is 
lowed,30 "[a] party requesting an award of 
torney fees has the burden of presenting 
ddence sufficient to support the award."31 
party which does not provide such evi-
nce , even if indisputably entitled to 
cover attorney fees, may not recover at 
l,32 even if there is no disputed issue of 
aterial fact.33 
Various types of evidence may be suffi-
ent to meet this burden. Generally, 
sufficient evidence should include the 
>urs spent on the case, the hourly rate 
arged for those hours, and the usual and 
stomary rates for such work."34 This evi-
nce should probably be submitted by 
Idavit,35 although testimony36 by counsel 
r the party requesting attorney fees is 
lowed.37 Practitioner should beware 
liance solely upon their own opinion, 
wever, as "[e]ven [if the] evidence is 
disputed, the trial judge [is] not neces-
rily compelled to accept such 
f-interested testimony whole cloth and 
ike . . . an award."38 
The simplest way for a practitioner to 
iet the initial evidentiary burden is to file 
affidavit in compliance with Rule 4-505 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administra-
n. Rule 4-505, designed "[t]o establish 
uniform criteria and a uniform format for 
affidavits in support of attorney[] fees,**'9 
provides: 
1) Affidavits in support of an award 
of attorneys fees must be filed with the 
court and set forth specifically the 
legal basis for the award, the nature of 
the work performed by the attorney, 
the number of hours spent to prosecute 
the claim to judgment, or the time spent 
in pursuing the matter to the stage for 
which attorney [] fees are claimed, and 
affirm the reasonableness of the fees 
for comparable legal services. 
(2) The affidavit must also sepa-
rately state hours by persons other 
than attorneys, for time spent, work 
completed and hourly rate billed.40 
Although Rule 4-505 does not require the 
inclusion of an hourly rate for each attorney 
working on the case,41 such information 
should probably also be included as "an hourly 
rate would likely be helpful to the court."42 
". . . the party requesting 
attorney fees is often entitled 
to fees incurred in pursuing only 
some portions of the lawsuit 
Once the initial burden of production is 
met, opposing counsel has the opportunity to 
investigate the evidence supporting the 
claimed fees. Although the procedure is 
meant to be informal, practitioners opposing 
an attorney fee award may challenge the evi-
dence, and the trial court is obligated to act 
"so that procedural fairness will be accorded 
one who opposes a requested award."43 The 
Supreme Court has summarized its position 
regarding the nature of this process: 
Although we do not intend to turn fee 
award determination into satellite liti-
gation with full scale discovery, 
thereby increasing the overall cost of 
litigation, an adversary-type mecha-
nism through which an opponent to a 
fee request can examine the accuracy 
of factual assertions underlying the 
request must be available. Usually, it 
will be sufficient if the opponent is 
provided access to supporting docu-
ments such as attorney time records. If 
necessary, however, a party should 
have an opportunity to contest the 
accuracy of the documents by either 
counter-affidavit or cross-examina-
tion of the opposing attorney before 
the court. Full-blown discovery 
should rarely be necessary.44 
Accordingly, practitioners should take 
advantage of the procedural protections, 
and investigate any request for attorney 
fees. In particular, inquiry should be con-
ducted to insure that the requested fees 
have been properly allocated,45 and meet 
the evidentiary46 and reasonableness47 
requirements discussed in this article. Fail-
ure to investigate, and dispute, at least 
some of the evidence presented in support 
of the request for attorney fees creates the 
risk of summary adjudication in favor of 
the party requesting the fees.48 However, if 
a party has failed to provide the court with 
sufficient evidence, or failed to properly 
allocate between the recoverable and non-
recoverable fees may result in a denial of 
the fee award altogether.49 
c. Allocation of fees 
Practitioners should also be aware of the 
rule50 that "[a] party is . . . entitled only to 
those fees resulting from its principle cause 
of action for which there is a contractual 
(or statutory) obligation for attorney[] 
fees."51 In other words, the party requesting 
attorney fees is often entitled to fees 
incurred in pursuing only some portions of 
the lawsuit, as authorized by statute, con-
tract, or equity. For example, attorney fees 
awarded under the terms of a contract may 
not allow recovery of all the fees generated 
in the lawsuit.52 Similarly, attorney fees 
awarded under a statute will not allow an 
award of fees incurred in pursuit of com-
mon law, or other statutory claims.53 
In the event a party is entitled to only 
some of the legal fees incurred, the practi-
tioner requesting attorney fees has the 
burden of allocating fees between the vari-
ous claims. The Utah Supreme Court has 
summarized: 
One who seeks an award of attorney 
fees must set out the time and fees 
expended for (1) successful claims 
for which there may be an entitlement 
to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful 
claims for which there would have 
been an entitlement to attorney fees 
had the claims been successful, and 
(3) claims for which there is no enti-
tlement to attorney fees.54 
A party who fails to allocate attorney fees 
between those which are recoverable, and 
those which are not, may forfeit the award 
entirely,55 at the trial court's discretion.56 
*A pnmer is defined as "a small introductory book on a sub-
ject" Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 934 (1986) 
This definition reflects that this article is not meant to be the 
complete word on its subject, but rather a review of the proce-
dures for recovering attorney fees in Utah 
2See generally 1984 Utah Law Review 533-669 (1984) 
3
 See Kelli L Sager, Attorney's Fees in Utah, 1984 Utah L 
Rev 553-571 (1984) 
4The terminology for this phrase vanes and has included 
"attorneys' fees," "attorney's fees," "attorney fee" and "attor-
ney fees " Because the Utah courts seem to have settled upon 
the nomenclature "attorney fees," this is the phrase used in this 
article See, eg Salmon v Davis County, 916 P2d 890 (1996) 
5Supra Note 4 at 563-65 
"Despite the focus of the 1984 symposium, the issue of attor-
ney fees is often ignored or given only cursory treatment by 
both practitioners and the courts As the Utah Supreme Court 
has noted, "[i]n many instances, where the question arises at 
all, the attorney fee issue is treated as incidental by the appel-
lant, who focuses on more substantial issues, and has accord-
ingly tended to receive the same kind of cursory treatment by 
us " Dixie State Bank v Broken, 764 P2d 985, 989 n 6 (Utah 
1988) This problem is compounded by the often confusing, or 
even contradictory, statements in Utah case law See, eg, 
notes 96 through 98 and accompanying text 
^Traditionally, Utah appellate courts have "generally reviewed 
a trial judge's decision on the issue of attorney fees for abuse 
of discretion " Salmon, supra note 4 at 892 However, in State 
v Pena, 869 P2d 932 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court 
clarified that in some cases the appropriate standard of review 
would be a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore 
require a somewhat different standard of review Id at 935-39 
Since then, the appropriate standard of review for an award of 
attorney fees has been subject to some debate Justice Durham 
now takes the position that "[i]n light of [Pena] the rea-
sonableness of an award of attorney fees ordinarily presents a 
question of law, with some measure of discretion given to the 
trial court in applying the reasonableness standard to a given 
set of facts " Id at 893 (Durham, J , lead opinion) However, 
Justice Durham may be alone in this approach Id at 897-98 
(disputing that Pena calls for a change in the standard of 
review for an award of attorney fees) (Russon, J , joined by 
Justice Howe, dissenting), id at 900 (Zimmerman, C J , con-
curring "in Justice Russon's articulation of the proper standard 
of review for a trial court's award of attorney fees "), id 
at 900 (Stewart J , making no comment on Justice Durham's 
argument) 
8550P2d 212 (Utah 1976) 
9Id at 215 Attorney fees were also not requested until after 
judgment was entered, and the request came one day before 
the time for filing a motion to amend expired Id It is unclear 
from the decision how much weight, if any, the court gave to 
this consideration 
* *The court noted that "[ajlbeit we say m fairness [a request 
for attorney fees in the pleadings] should be done we need not 
and do not decide that point" Id 
'
 2See e g Christensen v Farmers Insurance Exchange 669 
P2d 1236, 1239 (Utah 1983) (denying a request for attorney 
fees because, in part, "a review of the pleadings on file does 
not reflect any claim for attorney fees"), cf Projects 
Unlimited v Copper State Thrift 798 P2d 738 753 n 18 (Utah 
1990) (declining to award attorney fees to bank which was 
statutorily entitled to fees where bank 'did not request attor 
ney fees as part of its motion for summary judgment '), 
Cabrera v Cottrell 694 P2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985) (declining 
to award attorney fees on appeal where prevailing party 'has 
not sought them") 
, 3452P2d 325 (Utah 1969) 
^However, attorney fees could not have been raised in the 
original complaint, as the mechanics lien statute was not 
raised until the defendant contractor raised the statute by filing 
a counterclaim Id at 327 It is unclear from the decision how 
much weight, if any, the court gave to this consideration 
15Id at 328 (footnote omitted) (partial emphasis added) 
16Utah R Civ P 8(e) Other rules call for similar results, 
although they have not yet been used by Utah courts to allow an 
award of attorney fees See, eg Utah R Civ P 8(f) ("All plead-
ings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice "), Utah R 
Civ P 15(a) ("[A] party may amend his pleading only by leave 
of the court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave 
shall be freely given ") (emphasis added), Id ("A party may 
amend his pleading once as a matter of course before a respon-
sive pleading is served, "or, if no responsive pleading is allowed, 
"within 20 days after it is served "), Utah R Civ P 15(d) (allow-
ing filing of supplemental pleadings, noting "[permission [to 
file a supplemental pleading] may be granted even though the 
original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief 
or defense") (emphasis added) 
11
 Sears v Riemersma, 655 P 2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 1982) (allow-
ing party who requested attorney fees in counterclaim, but not in 
answer, to recover fees incurred in defending lawsuit because the 
other parties "were clearly on notice that [attorney fees] be 
awarded in connection with the dismissal of [the] complaint") 
18Rule 15(b) states, m relevant part 
If evidence is objected to at the dial on the ground that it is 
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of 
the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him m maintaining his action 
or defense on the merits 
Utah R Civ P 15 Because it is unlikely that an award of attor-
ney fees would prejudice an objecting party on the merits, a 
practitioner should almost always be able to argue that the issue 
of attorney fees may be raised as late as trial However, the deci-
sion is within the trial court's discretion, see infra note 8, and 
care should therefore be taken no to rely upon this approach 
unless absolutely necessary 
^Redevelopment Agency v Daskalas, 785 P2d 1112, 1125 
(Utah 1989) (holding that "the trial court was within its discre-
tion in concluding that the pleadings could be amended to 
include attorney fees, even though not initially raised m the 
pleadings") 
20Pope v Pope, 589 P2d 752, 753 (Utah 1978) ("[U]nder [Rule 
54(c)(1), an award of attorney[] fees in excess of that requested 
in the pleadings, is allowable where the proof shows the party to 
be entitled to it"), Ferguson v Ferguson, 564 P2d 1380, 1383 
(Utah 1977) (same), see also Utah R Civ P 54 (c)(1) ("[E]very 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose 
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demand-
ed such relief in his pleadings ") 
2 1
 Pope, 589 P2d at 753, Ferguson, 564 P2d at 1383, see also 
Utah R Civ P 54(c)(1) ("Except as to a party against whom a 
judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is enti-
tled ") (emphasis added) 
22Palmobi, supra note 13 at 328 
23Sears, supra note 17 at 1110 
2
^Such as in Palombi, supra note 13 at 328, where plaintiff was 
not allowed to seek recovery under the mechanics lien statute, 
but was allowed to recover fees as a prevailing party once defen-
dant raised a counterclaim under the statute 
2
-*"It has long been established that "[t]he general rule in Utah, 
and the traditional American Rule, subject to certain exceptions, 
is that attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party 
unless a statute or contract authorizes such an award " Stewart v 
Utah Public Service Com n, 885 P2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) 
However, recent decisions by the Utah courts may indicate an 
increased willingness to consider equitable grounds for award-
ing attorney fees See id at 782 (recognizing inherent power of 
courts to award fees where party acts in bad faith, vexatiously, 
wantonly or for oppressive reasons) id at 783 (recognizing 
power of court to award fees under common fund theory), id 
(recognizing power of court to award fees under private attorney 
general theory), see also Jensen v Bowcut 892 P2d 1053, 1059 
(Utah App 1995) (affirming an award of attorney fees based on 
principles of equity and justice as they relate to the specific cir 
cumstances of this case '), Saunders v Sharp 840 P2d 796 09 
(Utah App 1992) (noting that 'courts may, in some situations 
award attorney tees on an equitable basis ) 
26This conclusion is based upon the author s own observations 
and those of a number of practitioners in Salt Lake City, Utah 
2
'There are exceptions, such as an award of attorney fees for 
failure to comply with discovery requests, or Rule 11 sanctions 
See Utah R Civ P 37 ("If the motion [to compel compliance 
with a discovery request] is granted, the court shall requir 
the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion 
to pay the reasonable expenses incurred mcludin< 
attorney fees "), Utah R Civ P 11 ("If a [court paper] i 
singed in violation of this rule, the court shall impose 
an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay 
a reasonable attorney fee") 
conclusion is based upon the author's own observation 
and those of a number of practitioners in Salt Lake City, Utah 
29See, eg, Utah Code Ann §78-27-56 (1992) (awardin 
attorney fees to a prevailing party where action was withou 
merit or brought in bad faith), see also Hermes Assocs i 
Park's Sportsman, 813 P2d 1221, 1225 (Utah App 1991 
(requiring proof of three discrete elements before attorney fee 
may be awarded under §78-27-56) 
-^After pleading attorney fees, the parties must obviously lit 
igate the right to attorney fees This step is beyond the scop 
of this article 
3*Salmon, supra note 4 at 893 This has been the explicit nil 
in Utah since at least 1945 See Mason v Mason, 160 P 2d 730 
733 (1945) 
32See, e g Dixie, supra note 6 at 988, see also Regional Sale 
Agency, Inc v Reichart, 784 P2d 1210, 1126 (Utah App con 
stitutes an abuse of discretion and must be overruled") 
Bangerter v Poulton, 663 P2d 100, 103 (Utah 1983) ("[T]h 
award of the trial court of attorney's fees and certain costs I 
not supported by any evidence in the record and is reversed ") 
""Even if there were no disputed issue of material fact, thi 
summary judgment would not award an attorneys fee withou 
a stipulation as to the amount, an unrebutted affidavit, or evi 
dence given as to the value thereof" Freed Finance Compan 
v Stoker Motor Company, 537 P2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975) 
Therefore, even if the opposing party does not dispute the fe< 
award, practitioners should take care to submit either a stipu 
lation, an affidavit, or other evidence regarding the value of thi 
requested attorney fees In the event evidence is undisputed,. 
party may be entitled to recover attorney fees by summary dis 
position See infra note 88 and accompanying text 
34Salmon, supra note 4 at 893, see also Cottonwood Mall Co 
v Sine, 830 P2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992) 
3->Aside from the obvious advantages of submitting a fe< 
request in writing, rather than by oral testimony, a written fe< 
request reduces the chance that counsel requesting attorney 
fees will be subject to cross examination However, a paitf 
may be entitled to cross examine regardless of the metho< 
chosen to submit the evidence As the Utah Supreme Court ha 
noted, "[i]f necessary a party should have an opportunity 
to contest the accuracy of the documents by either counter 
affidavit or cross-examination of the opposing attorney befon 
the court " Cottonwood Mall, supra note 34 at 269 
^Associated Indus Developments v Jewkes, 701 P2d 486 
489 (Utah 1985) (finding "trial court abrogated its responsi 
bility to undertake a full inquiry" of evidence in support o 
attorney fees by refusing to receive testimony by attorney fo 
party requesting fee), Stubbs v Hemmert, 567 P2d 168, 17( 
(Utah 1977) (finding trial court's award of attorney fees wa 
reasonable based, in part, upon testimony of plaintiff's attor 
ney), see also Associated Indus Developments, 701 P2d a 
488 ("Logically, the attorney claiming the fee ought to be 
valuable and relevant source of information concerning thi 
composition of that fee "), but see Paul Mueller Co v Cachi 
Valle\ Dairy Assoc 657 P2d 1279,1287-88 (Utah 1982) (not 
ing that where "detailed billing records" were submitted b1 
stipulation, trial court abused its discretion in relying onh 
upon statement of counsel at post-trial hearing) 
^ 'A practitioner should not, however, object on the ground 
that counsel cannot act as both a witness and an attorney in 
case First, such an argument is incorrect See Utah Rule o 
Professional Conduct 3 7(a)(2) (allowing attorney to testif 
where [t]he testimony relates to the nature and value of lega 
services rendered in the case ) see also Associated Indus 
Developments supra note 36 at 489 n 1 (allowing attorney t< 
testify regarding attorney fees under previous version of Rule 
of Professional Conduct) Second if the trial court erroneous 
ly sustains the objection the appellate court may find thj 
'counsel cannot successfully object at trial to [opposing 
counsel s testimony about his fee and then complain on appea 
that plaintiff has failed to prove the reasonableness of the tee 
Id at 489 (declining to reverse award of attorney fees fo 
insufficient evidence where attorney for party requesting fee 
was not allowed to testify because opposing counsel objecte< 
on grounds that "attorneys are not permitted to testify in case 
in which they represent" a party) 
12 Vol 9 No 
^Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520.523-24 (Utah 1978); 
see also Regional, supra, note 32 at 1215 ("[A] trial court is 
lot compelled to accept the self-serving testimony of a party 
equesting attorney fees even if there is no opposing testimo-
ny."'); Paul Mueller Co.. supra note 36 at 1287-88 (noting "it is 
lot good practice to make an award [of an attorney fee] pred-
cated only upon [the] opinion [of a party's artome\].") (quot-
ng 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §812e(2). at 1554.): but see infra note 
}8 and accompanying text (discussing propriety of summary 
udgment motion for attorney fees where no disputed issue of 
naterial fact). 
*
9Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-505. 
% 
X]In LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189 (Utah App. 
1991). the Utah Court of Appeals noted the hourly rate for 
;ach attorney is not required, and that 4l[s]o long as the legal 
5asis of the award, the nature of the work performed by the 
ittorneys, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim, 
md some affirmation that the fees charged are reasonable in 
light of comparable legal services are included in the affidavit 
submitted by the party requesting the fees, there is no failure 
o comply with Rule 4-505(1). Id. at 198. Inconsistent state-
ments have also been made in this area. Although perhaps dis-
linguishable because the court was not discussing Rule 4-505, 
[he Utah Supreme Court has apparently contradicted the state-
ment in LMV Leasing, by noting that "[sjufficient evidence 
should include the hours spent on the case, the hourly rate 
charged for those hours, and the usual and customary rates for 
such work." Salmon, supra note 4 at 893 (emphasis added). 
42 Id. 
" Cottonwood Mall, supra note 34 at 269. 
^Cottonwood Mall, supra note 34 at 268-69 
**See infra notes 34 through 38 and accompanying text. 
*
6See subsection c. 
4
'See subsection b. 
^See infra note 88 and accompanying text. "Specifically, where 
attorney fees are awarded to a prevailing party on summary judg-
ment, the undisputed, material facts must establish, as a matter 
of law. that (1) the parry is entitled to the award and (2) the 
amount awarded is reasonable." Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770 
P.2d 163, 169 (Utah App. 1989). 
^See infra notes 32 through 33 and accompanying text, and 
subsection c in general. 
allocation issue is treated as separate rule by the courts, 
independent of the reasonableness analysis discussed in section 
d. See, infra notes 48 through 51; but see Mountain States 
Broadcasting v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 649 n.10 (Utah App. 1989) 
(noting that "a reasonable fee" will only compensate party for 
those fees expended upon issues where the party prevailed.). 
* * Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 
66(1981). 
^See, e.g., Paul Mueller Co., supra note 36 at 1288 (allowing 
only those fees incurred in defense of the main causes of action, 
but not those incurred in pursuit of counterclaim); Stubbs, supra 
note 36 at 170 & n. 11 (refusing to award any attorney fees 
incurred in trial where contractual liability for fees was limited 
to collection of debt and these claims were settled before trial); 
Sears, supra note 17 at 1110 (upholding trial court's reduction in 
fees where trial court found "'a goodly portion of the time' 
would have been directed to activities other than simply defend-
ing against. . . the claim."); Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 
858 (Utah 1984) ("[A] party is entitled only to those fees attrib-
utable to the successful vindication of contractual rights within 
the terms of the agreement"). 
^See, e.g. Graco Fishing v. Jronwood Exploration, 766 P.2d 
1074,1079-80 (Utah 1988) (remanding for allocation of attorney 
fees between those incurred in pursuit of successful claims under 
one statute, and unsuccessful claims pursued under other 
statute). 
^Cottonwood Mall, supra note 34 at 269-70. 
55Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n supra note 51 at 66. 
(finding no abuse of discretion in trial courts refusal to award 
any attorney fees where party requesting fees failed to distin-
guish between time "spent prosecuting its complaint and the 
portion spent in defending the counterclaim"); Selvage v. J.J. 
Johnson & Assoc, 910P.2d 1252, 1266 n.16 (Utah App. 1996) 
(noting that "it may be proper to deny a request for attorney 
fees if the requesting party fails to allocate in accord with the 
directive of Cottonwood MalF). 
-
6
"[S]uch a decision is within the trial court's discretion, 
rather than being a strict legal requirement." Selvage, supra 
note 55 at 1266 n.15 (citing Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 
1384, 1394 (Utah App. 1994)). * 
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The Recovery of Attorney Fees in Utah: 
A Procedural Primer for Practitioners - Part II 
By James E. Magleby 
Editor's note: Part I was published in the 
December 1996 issue of the Bar Journal. 
d. Reasonableness of Fees 
Once the initial evidentiary burdens are 
met,57 the trial court must determine what 
constitutes a "reasonable" attorney fee, the 
issue upon which practitioners will proba-
bly find the majority of their energy 
focused once an award of fees is made.58 
In determining a reasonable attorney 
fee, Utah trial courts have considered a 
number of factors, although it is important 
to note that "[t]he question of what is a 
reasonable attorneyf] fee in a contested 
matter is not necessarily controlled by any 
set formula."59 Among others,60 Utah courts 
have considered the following factors:61 
1. The difficulty of the litigation. 
2. The efficiency of the attorneys in 
presenting the case. 
3. The fee customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services. 
4. The amount involved in the case. 
5. The result attained. 
6. The expertise and experience of the 
attorneys involved.62 
7. The amount in controversy. 
8. The extent of services rendered. 
9. *'[0]ther factors which the trial 
court is in an advantaged position 
to judge."63 
10. The relationship of the fee to the 
amount recovered. 
11. The novelty and difficulty of the 
issues involved. 
12. The overall result achieved. 
13. The necessity of initiating the 
lawsuit.M 
In addition, although never explicitly listed 
as a factor, the courts have considered 
whether the opposing party pursued an 
'inconsistent and unmeritorious" litigation 
strategy,65 or acted to "complicate[] and make 
more difficult" the discovery process.66 
However, in Dixie State Bank v. 
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Bracken*1 the Utah Supreme Court recog-
nized the confusion created by Utah case 
law,68 and "in order to foster consistent and 
equitable fee awards . . . constructed 'prac-
tical guidelines' for analyzing the 
reasonableness of attorney fees, by consol-
idating the approaches advocated in 
then-existing case law into a simple four-
step procedure."69 The court announced the 
general rule that although many "factors 
may be explicitly considered in deter-
mining a reasonable fee, as a practical 
matter the trial court should find answers 
to four questions:"70 
1. What legal work was actually 
performed? 
2. How much of the work performed 
was reasonably necessary to ade-
quately prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent 
with the rates customarily charged 
in the locality for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which 
require consideration of additional 
factors, including those listed in the 
Code of Professional Responsibility?71 
Accordingly, at the minimum, practitioners 
who seek an award of attorney fees should 
argue these four factors before the trial 
court to withstand appeal. If additional fac-
tors are to be argued, practitioners should 
alert the court that they are properly con-
sidered under the fourth step of Dixie.12 
The Dixie court's attempt to clarify the 
appropriate procedure for determining rea-
sonable attorney fees has not, however, 
eliminated the confusion over the issue. 
Despite the Dixie court's attempt to create 
a uniform format for considering the rea-
sonableness of an award of attorney fees, 
Utah courts have not demanded rigorous 
adherence to the four factors,7^ even as 
recently as 1996.4 At first glance, this may 
suggest that so long as the trial court's 
award is based upon consideration of some 
mix of factors, and is supported by the evi-
dence, it will withstand review. This is not, 
however, always the case."5 
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The Utah Court of Appeals has addressed 
this apparent deviation, noting that Cabrera 
"is often cited for the same principles as 
Dixie."16 Although it is not immediately 
obvious from a comparison of the cases,77 
the Quinn court concluded that both Cabrera 
and Dixie "ultimately recommend consid-
eration of the same factors."78 However, the 
Quinn court went on to apply Dixie, "both 
because it was decided after Cabrera, and 
because we believe its four step approach 
is simpler to apply, and will therefore lead 
to more consistently correct results."79 
The confusion is enhanced by occa-
sional reliance by Utah courts upon Rule 
4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial Admin-
istration to affirm the reasonableness of 
attorney fees. Although Rule 4-505 appears 
designed to facilitate the submission of 
evidence regarding attorney fees, and does 
not specifically80 call for practitioners to 
submit evidence on all four factors enunci-
ated in Dixie** practitioners who comply 
with the rule can argue that under Utah 
law, they have offered sufficient evidence 
of reasonableness to withstand appeal.82 
In addition, practitioners should take 
care that the trial court does not improperly 
modify a request for attorney fees based 
upon considerations disfavored by Utah 
appellate courts. First, it should be noted 
that attorney fees in excess of a damages 
award are not per se unreasonable.83 Further-
more, "what an attorney bills or the number 
of hours spent on a case is not determina-
tive."84 Finally, "although the amount in 
controversy can be a factor in determining a 
reasonable fee, care should be used in 
putting much reliance on this factor."85 
Accordingly, if the trial court appears 
inclined to base an award of attorney fees on 
one or more of these factors, a practitioner 
should encourage the trial court to do so as 
part of its consideration of the four factors 
enumerated in Dixie. 
Because of the inconsistent manner in 
which the reasonableness analysis is con-
ducted in Utah case law, practitioners face 
the dilemma of how to proceed in presenting 
reasonableness arguments. The best possible 
approach appears to be that taken in Quinn, 
which suggests that practitioners should 
urge trial courts to explicitly consider, at the 
minimum, the first three factors enunciated 
in Dixie. The trial court should then under-
take evaluate the fourth Dixie factor, and 
determine if other evidence would be help-
ful. If the answer is affirmative, then any of 
the additional factors may be considered.86 
e. Findings 
Once an award of attorney fees has been 
made, the trial court must make written 
findings of fact explaining the grounds for 
the award, and why the amount awarded 
constitutes a reasonable fee. The only 
established exception87 to this rule under 
Utah law is where all the relevant facts are 
undisputed, as in a summary judgment 
motion.88 However, even in this context, 
practitioners should be wary, as it takes lit-
tle to create a disputed issue of fact.89 
However, trial courts often fail to make 
findings in support of an award of attorney 
fees,90 or make findings which fails to con-
sider the appropriate factors,91 requiring the 
case to be remanded after appeal. Practi-
tioners who prevail at trial should therefore 
take care that the trial court makes findings 
articulating the grounds for an award of 
attorney fees in a manner which will with-
stand appellate review. 
Findings are required in almost every 
situation where attorney fees have been 
contested. Utah appellate courts "have con-
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sistently encouraged trial courts to make 
findings to explain the factors which they 
considered relevant in arriving at an attorney 
fee award. Findings are particularly impor-
tant when the evidence on attorney fees is 
in dispute . . . ."92 Detailed findings are also 
particularly important in complex cases.93 
Trial courts have also shown a tendency to 
reduce attorney fee awards sua sponte, or 
in the face of uncontested evidentiary sub-
missions.94 In this event, the necessity of 
detailed findings is even more imperative. 
Where the evidence supporting the 
reasonableness of requested attorney 
fees is both adequate and entirely 
undisputed, as it was here, the court 
abuses its discretion in awarding less 
than the amount requested unless the 
reduction is warranted by one or 
more of the factors described in 
[Dixie State Bank]. . . . To permit 
meaningful review on appeal, it is 
necessary that the trial court, on the 
record, identify such factors and oth-
erwise explain the basis for its sua 
sponte reduction.95 
Accordingly, in order for almost any award 
of attorney fees to survive appeal, the trial 
court must enter findings in support of the 
award. Practitioners, therefore, should 
encourage the trial court to make findings 
regarding the award. Although it may be 
counter-intuitive, this is particularly true in 
cases where a party does not oppose a fee 
request, but has the fee reduced by the trial 
court in their favor. Utah appellate courts 
are especially demanding about findings in 
this situation. 
f. Sufficient Findings 
Although it is clear that trial courts must 
make findings in support of a fee award, 
the amount of detail required is not as 
obvious. The exact amount of detail 
required to survive appellate review is dif-
ficult to determine from a review of Utah 
case law, as each decision seems to involve 
different reasoning, and some have reached 
conflicting results. For example, one Utah 
Supreme Court Justice has upheld a reduc-
tion in attorney fees based only upon an 
oral ruling from the bench that the fees 
were "excessive."46 However, the remainder 
of the court was not in agreement,47 and this 
position was inconsistent with that taken 
by the Court of Appeals two years earlier.98 
Despite the confusion created by such 
comparisons, the courts have offered some 
general guidance. It appears, at least in the 
context of a sua sponte reduction of fees, that 
merely listing some of the factors involved 
in the determination of "reasonableness," 
without more, is not adequate. For example, 
in Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assocs.,99 the 
trial court's entire findings merely stated that 
the fee award was based upon: 
"'the amount in dispute, the complex-
ity of the issues presented, the hourly 
rates charged by the plaintiffs' attor-
neys and the total evidence presented 
at trial.'"100 
Although the trial court evaluated some of 
the factors which could be considered under 
the fourth Dixie factor,101 and made written 
findings of fact, the Utah Court of Appeals 
remanded the case to the trial court to enter 
more detailed findings, noting that "[s]uch 
conclusory statements do not satisfy the 
requirement that awards of attorney fees 
must be supported by adequate findings of 
fact."102 The court also noted that "[v]ague 
statements which require speculation as to 
the actual reasons behind the ruling are not 
enough to meet this burden."103 To withstand 
review, findings should be as detailed as 
findings supporting a damages award.104 Fur-
thermore, "[t]hese findings must be 
sufficiently detailed, and include enough 
subsidiary facts, to disclose the steps by which 
the trial court's decision was reached."105 
"Practitioners should urge the 
trial court to make as 
detailed findings as possible." 
Although Utah case law does little to 
clarify the exact amount of detail necessary 
to sustain an award of attorney fees on 
appeal, it does indicate that practitioners 
should urge the trial court to make as 
detailed findings as possible.106 In order to 
create as thorough a record as possible, prac-
titioners should urge the trial court to make 
written findings which track the steps in the 
decision to award attorney fees. The trial 
court should therefore make a written 
record107 which does the following: (1) iden-
tify the legal basis for the decision to award 
attorney fees, whether it be by statute, con-
tract, or equity; (2) identify or acknowledge 
the evidence submitted by the party or par-
ties requesting fees; (3) identify any 
evidence offered in opposition to the fee 
request; (4) identify any allocation issues, 
and the role they played in the fee award: 
(5) identify the factors it considered in 
determining what constitutes a "reason-
able" attorney fee;108 and (6) explain how 
the factors affected the calculation of the 
amount of the award. 
g. Scope of Attorney Fees Request 
Utah case law has also partially defined 
what may be included in an award of attor-
ney fees. The Utah Supreme Court has 
allowed recovery of fees incurred by para-
legals in preparing the case.109 It has 
similarly upheld a trial court's inclusion of 
paralegal fees in an award of attorney fees.110 
Practitioners should also investigate 
whether they are entitled to prejudgment 
interest on attorney fees.111 
Finally, for those practitioners who are 
representing themselves, it should be noted 
that Utah follows "the general rule that pro 
se litigants should not recover attorney fees 
for successful litigation.""2 This rule applies 
even if the pro se litigant is a licensed 
attorney,113 although one member of the 
Utah Supreme Court argued in favor of "the 
position . . . that non-attorney pro se litigants 
may be entitled to an award of attorney 
fees in appropriate circumstances."114 
m. CONCLUSION 
The ability to sustain a recovery of 
attorney fees is made difficult by the con-
fusing nature of Utah case law on the 
subject. Because the confusion is shared by 
trial courts and practitioners, a practitioner 
who wishes to sustain an award of attorney 
fees on appeal must first meet the initial 
burdens of pleading and evidentiary pro-
duction. Next, the practitioner should 
encourage the trial court to follow the pro-
cedural steps outlined by Utah appellate 
courts, in particular the consideration of 
the appropriate factors in making the fee 
award. Finally, practitioners should urge 
trial courts to place their reasoning on the 
record, so that the award will withstand 
appellate review. 
" i t should be reiterated that it the e\idence in support ot an 
award of attorne) tees is insufficient the tnal court s finding 
that an attorney tee award was "reasonable * will not withstand 
appeal "When the eudence presented is insufficient, the 
court s evaluation ot [the reasonableness ot] those tees will 
also be insufficient Cottonwood Mull supra note 34 at 269 
-
)
°" Perhaps the most frequently litigated ii>sue involving attor-
ney[] fees in Utah is that ot determining what constitutes a 
'reasonable fee,M Sager, supra note 3 at 563 
59Wallace \ Build. Inc . 402 P2d 699, 701 (Utah 1965)). see 
also Dixie, supra note 6 at 989 ("[W]hat constitutes a reason-
able fee is not necessarily controlled by any set formula") (cit-
Vol 10 So 1 
g Wallace) 
^The factors considered by trial courts have varied over time 
3r example, tnal courts once considered "whether the accep-
nce of employment will preclude the lawyer's appearing 
>r others in cases likely to arise out of the transactions," "will 
volve the loss of other employment," "the contingency or the 
"rtainty of the compensation," and "the character of the 
nployment, whether casual or for an established and constant 
lent" Thatcher v Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 568, 207 
2d 178, 183-84 (1949), see also FMA Fin Corp v Build, 
ic , 404 P2d 670, 673 (Utah 1965) (noting, with regard to the 
llue of legal services, "that the judge may fix it on the basis 
his own knowledge and experience, and/or in connection 
ith reference to a Bar approved schedule') These factors 
lve not been considered in recent decisions, and so are orrut-
d from the list 
'The reader's conclusion that the list may repeat itself is cor-
ct The listed factors are taken from cases cited in the Dixie 
vision, and are listed as they appear in the cases cited, with 
ire taken to maintain nearly identical language with that in 
e decisions The result gives a glimpse of the similarity of 
e factors considered by the courts, but also reveals the hap-
izard and sometimes confusing manner in which evaluation 
r
 the reasonableness of attorney fees has been conducted 
-Factors 1 through 6 were discussed in Dixie, supra note 6 at 
19 (citing Cabrera, supra note 12 at 625) These factors were 
*nved from the Code of Professional Responsibility Cabrera 
624 However, consideration of these factors is not manda-
ry, as the court noted only that "the tnal court may take into 
count the provisions" of the Code of Professional 
esponsibility in setting reasonable attorney fees Id 
'Factors 7 through 9 were discussed in Dixie, supra note 6 at 
19 (citing Wallace v Build, Inc, 16 Utah 2d 410, 402 P2d 
)9, 701 (1965)) 
^Factors 10 through 13 were discussed in Dixie, supra note 6 at 
19 (citing Trayner v Cushing, 688 P2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984)) 
)Dixie, supra note 6 at 991 In this regard, the court noted 
at the losing party's litigation strategy "converted the action 
om a routine collection action into a brouhaha of much 
rger proportions" which "increased [the attorney fees] sever-
-fold over what they should have been " Id 
'Morgan v Morgan, 854 P2d 559, 570 (Utah App 1993), see 
so Finlayson v Finlayson, 874 P2d 843, (Utah App 1994) 
oting that tnal "court correctly based its award of attorney 
fees on Husband's noncompliance with its intenm orders") 
"'Supra note 6 
68The Utah Supreme Court felt that Dixie, "which involves only 
the issue of attorney fees, provides us with a unique opportunity 
to clanfy our standards for evaluating attorney fees awards 
against an abuse of-discretion standard 
69In re Quinn, 830 P2d 282, 235 (Utah App 1992) 
^Dixie State Bank, supra note 6 at 992 
' * Dixie State Bank, supra note 6 at 992 This last consideration 
is a catch-all which may include some, or all, of the other factors 
considered in awarding attorney fees Although appropnate 
because of the many possible issues which may anse in evaluat-
ing the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees, because of 
the broad nature of the fourth step, the Utah Supreme Court's 
attempt to "clanfy" the "standards for evaluating attorney fee 
awards" may be less effective than hoped 
72The Utah Court of Appeals descnbes the process as follows 
"After consideration of the first three cntena, a tnal court can 
establish a preliminary fee by multiplying the number of neces-
sary hours of legal work performed by the appropnate hourly 
rate " Quinn, supra note 69 at 285 The court then noted that 
"after the preliminary fee is established, Dixie's fourth step asks 
that courts adjust the amount of that fee, when necessary, to 
reflect the court's consideration of vanous cntena set forth in 
Utah Code of Professional Re »ponsibihty DR 2-106" Id The 
author believes this procedure I > incorrect First, multiplying the 
necessary hours by the hourly rate completely ignores the first 
factor, consideration of the legal work actually performed 
Second, the author does not read Dixie to require consideration 
of only the cntena set forth in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility See Dixie, mpra note 6 at 990 (noting that court 
should consider whether there are "circumstances which require 
consideration of additional factors, including those listed in the 
Code of Professional Responsibility") (emphasis added) 
73See, e g Baldwin v Burton, 850 P2d 1188, 1200 (Utah 1993) 
(upholding tnal court's award of attorney fees based upon mix of 
factors), Equitable Life & Cos Ins Co v Ross, 849 P2d 1187, 
1194 (Utah App 1993) (same), Cottonwood Mall, supra note 34 
at 269 (considenng only the factors enumerated in Cabrera, 
supra note 12 at 625), see also infra note 72 (discussing failure 
of Utah Court of Appeals to consider fact that tnal court did not 
consider any of the first three factors enunciated in Dixie) 
'^See Salmon, supra note 4 at 893 (considenng only the factors 
enumerated in Cabrera, supra note 12 at 625) 
15See Brown v Richards, 840 P 2d 143, 155 (Utah App 1992) 
(tnal court abused its discretion where "none [of the factors 
considered] answer[ed] the basic questions posed in Dixie 
State Bank"), Govert Copier Painting v Van Leeuwen, 801 
P2d 163, 174 (Utah App 1990) (remanding case where, 
although tnal court "explained its reason for reducing the 
attorney fee award, [it] did not utilize the factors established 
by appellate courts as relevant to a reduction of fees"), 
American Vending Services, Inc v Morse, 881 P 2d 917, 926 
(Utah App 1994) ("[T]he tnal court's cursory statement that 
the requested attorney fees were 'excessive,' failed to show 
that it had undergone an analysis similar to that contemplated 
in Dixie State Bank "), Hoth at 220, Rappleve v Rappleye, 855 
P2d 260, (Utah App 1993) (remanding case where findings, 
"failed to demonstrate that the award was arnved at after 
proper consideration of the relevant factors for determining the 
reasonableness of attorney fee awards"), Mountain States 
Broadcasting, supra note 50 at 649 n 10 (remanding case for 
determination of "reasonableness" under Dixie State Bank fac-
tors where tnal court had "simply awarded each [party] the 
total amount of its accumulated billing statements "), Sorensen 
v Sorensen, 769 P2d 820, 832 (Utah App 1989) (reversing 
award of attorney fees where evidence offered "reflect[ed] 
only the time spent and the rates charged") 
16Quinn, supra note 69 at 285 n 3 
''Cabrera appears to involve the consideration of factors not 
contained in Dixie Specifically, Cabrera calls for evaluation 
of "the difficulty of the litigation," "the amount involved in the 
case and the result attained," and "the expertise and expenence 
of the attorneys involved" Cabrera, supra note 12 at 625 A 
review of the first three factors in Dixie does not yield the 
obvious conclusion that these factors should be considered 
rule makes the general statement that the affidavit sub-
mitted in support of a request for attorney fees should "affirm 
the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services " 
See supra note 40 While the use of the term "reasonable" 
could be read to call for consideration of all four Dixie factors, 
the plain meaning of the phrase more likely comcides with 
only the third factor, the rates customanly charged in the local-
ity for similar services See infra note 81 
°*Rule 4-505 calls for a descnption of "the nature of the work 
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uary 1997 
performed by the attorney" probably equivalent to the first 
Dixie factor, the legal work actually performed The rule also 
mandates that the affidavit "affirm the reasonableness of the 
fees for comparable legal services," probably equivalent to the 
third Dixie factor, the rates customarily charged in the locality 
for similar services The rule does not, however, call for con-
sideration of the amount of work reasonably necessary to ade-
quately prosecute the matter, or circumstances which may 
require consideration of additional factors, the second and 
fourth factors considered in Dixie 
%2See Estate of Covington v Josephson, 888 P2d 675, 679 
(Utah App 1994) (upholding award of attorney fees where 
unrebutted affidavit "comphe[d] with the requirements of Rule 
4-505," noting that "the trial court was not required to take fur-
ther evidence regarding attorney fees "), Equitable Life & Cas 
Ins Co v Ross, 849 P2d 1187, 1194-95 (Utah App 1993) 
(finding that trial court's award of attorney fees "is amply sup-
ported by the evidence and appears to be reasonable, especial-
ly in light of the fact that affidavit with detailed billing 
statements attached strictly complied with Rule 4-505 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration "), LMV Leasing 
supra, note 41 at 198-99 (upholding reasonableness of attor-
ney fees where affidavit complied with Rule 4-505) 
°3"The total amount of the attorney fees awarded in this case 
cannot be said to be unreasonable just because it is greater 
than the amount recovered on the contract The amount of the 
damages awarded in a case does not place a necessary limit on 
the amount of attorney [] fees that can be awarded " Cabrera, 
supra note 12 at 625 
°^Dixie State Bank, supra note 6 at 990, see also Mountain 
States Broadcasting, supra note 50 at 649 n 10 (remanding 
case for determination of "reasonableness" under Dixie State 
Bank factors where trial court had "simply awarded each 
[party] the total amount of its accumulated billing statements "), 
Sorensen v Sorensen, 769 P2d 820, 832 (Utah App 1989) 
(reversing award of attorney fees where evidence offered 
"reflected] only the time spent and the rates charged") 
^Dixie State Bank, supra note 6 at 990 In this regard, the 
court made the salient point that "[i]t is a simple fact in a 
lawyer's life that it takes about the same amount of time to col-
lect a note in the amount of $1,000 as it takes to collect a note 
for $100,000" Id 
°" Although it should be noted that some factors have appar-
ently fallen into disfavor See supra note 60 
° 'One potential way to survive appeal is to argue in favor of 
implied findings See, eg, Hall v Hall, 858 P2d 1018, 1025 
(Utah App 1993) (findings "can be implied if it is reasonable 
to assume that the trial court actually considered the contro-
verted evidence and necessarily made a finding") However, 
this tactic has not met with favorable results In Selvage, for 
example, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected the argument that 
a "fair reading" of the record supported the trial court's award, 
applying a strict interpretation of the Hall test Taylor, supra 
note 55 at 1265 
**
8In Taylor supra note 88 at 168, the Utah Court of Appeals 
examined whether the rule "that findings of fact are unneces-
sary in connection with summary judgment decisions," Id at 
168, applied to summary judgment regarding an award of 
attorney fees The court found that "[a]lthough it may be 
unusual for the facts concerning attorney fees to be undisput-
ed, the rule is no different where the subject of the summary 
judgment is a claim for attorney fees " Id (footnote omitted) In 
support, the Utah Court of Appeals noted "[o]ther cases recog-
nize that finding are unnecessary to support an award of fees 
where the relevant facts are undisputed " Taylor at 169 n 6 (cit-
ing Freed Fin Co v Stoker Motor Co, 537 P2d 1039, 1040 
(Utah 1975) (attorney fees may be awarded on summary judg-
ment if the record contains a stipulation, an unrebutted affidavit, 
or evidence supporting the reasonableness of the award), South 
Sanpitch Co v Pack, 765 P2d 1279, 1283 (Utah App 1988) 
(uncontroverted testimony concerning amount of reasonable fee 
provides adequate basis for fee award)) It is also possible that 
findings in support of an award of attorney fees could be 
implied, although no Utah court has yet to do so See supra note 
87 and accompanying text 
°
9In this regard, a request for attorney fees by summary judg-
ment is no different from any other summary judgment motion 
"It takes only one competent sworn statement to dispute the 
averments on the other side of the controversy and create an 
issue of fact" Redevelopment Agency v Daskalas, supra note 19 
at 1126 (reversing trial court's award of attorney fees where 
opposing party filed affidavit controverting reasonableness of 
fee), see also Provo City Corporation v Cropper, 497 P2d 629, 
630 (Utah 1972) ("[UJnless the parties agree otherwise, the 
court is obliged to take evidence on the issue of reasonableness 
of attorneyf] fees and to make findings thereon") (emphasis 
added), FMA Financial, supra (reversing award of attorney 
fees where no evidence was presented and no findings made 
because the award "was an issue of fact which was denied") 
90See, e g, Rappleye v Rappleye, 855 P2d 260, 266 (Utah App 
1993) (remanding case to dial court where "trial court articulat-
ed no reasonable basis for its ultimate award"), Saunders v 
Sharp, 818 P 2d 574, 580 (Utah App 1991) (remanding case to 
trial court "for an adequate explanation of the amount of fees 
awarded" where trial court "gave no explanation to support" 
award), In re Estate of Quinn, 784 P2d 1238, 1249 (Utah App 
1989) ("The absence in the record before us of findings and con-
clusions on me issue of attorney fees compels remand to the trial 
court to correct that deficiency in the record), cert denied, 795 
P2d 1138 (Utah 1990) 
91
 See supra note 84 and cases therein discussing failure of trial 
courts to properly consider the Dixie factors 
^Regional, supra note 32 at 1215. 
* J See Brown, supra note 75 at 156 (finding that trial court's 
findings where "simply too sparse" where "award of attorney 
fees is a complex matter due to the adjudication of multiple 
claims arising under several contracts with each party winning 
some and losing some") 
9
^See, eg Selvage, supra note 55 at 1265 (trial court reduced 
fees where "the reasonableness of the fee and the supporting 
affidavit where uncontroverted by the opposing party"), 
Regional, supra note 32 at 1215 
95Martindale v Adams, 111 P2d 514, 517-18 (Utah App 1989) 
(emphasis added, see also Selvage, supra note 55 at 1265 (not-
ing that "[t]he need for sufficiently detailed findings is especial-
ly great where, as here, the reasonableness of the fee and the sup-
porting affidavit where uncontroverted by the opposing party") 
(quoting Martindale), Regional Sales Agency Inc, supra note 
32 1215 ("Findings are particularly important when the trial 
court has reduced the attorney fees from those requested and 
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supported by undisputed evidence ") In fact, it may be a trial 
court's duty to reduce an uncontroverted request for attorney 
fees See Hoth v White, 799 P 2d 213, 220 (Utah App 1990) 
("A court need not award the entire amount requested, but [it] 
must evaluate the requested fees to determine if a lesser 
amount is reasonable under the circumstances") (emphasis 
added) However, although the Hoth court cited Regional, 
supra note 32 at 1215, in support of this proposition, it is not 
clear that Regional stands for a mandatory evaluation of the 
fees Regional at 1215 ("[E]ven if there is no opposing testi-
mony [a] trial court can evaluate the fees requested and 
determine a lesser amount is reasonable under the circum-
stances") (emphasis added) It is also unclear if a court must 
engage in such considerations if there is no dispute regarding 
the reasonableness of the requested fees See infra note 88, 
discussing whether a trial court must make findings in context 
of summary judgment motion 
™ Salmon, supra note 4 at 901 ("trial court's oral ruling from 
the bench that [the] bills were 'excessive' is minimally suffi-
cient to support the reduction here ") (Zimmerman, C J , con-
curring) (emphasis added), id at 899 (upholding award of 
attorney fees, noting the trial court "need only make findings 
sufficient to support the ultimate award ") (Russon, J , dissent-
ing) 
^Id at 894 (declining to award attorney fees where evidence 
was insufficient and "trial court made no findings to support 
its reduction, except for the 'finding that most cases have a 
cap ") (Durham, J , lead opinion) 
98American Vending Services, Inc v Morse, 881 P 2d 917, 
926 (Utah App 1994) ("[T]he tnal court's cursory statement 
that the requested attorney fees were 'excessive,' failed to 
show that it had undergone an analysis similar to that contem-
plated in Dixie State Bank ") 
99Supra note 55 at 1252 
*00/d at 1265 (quoting tnal court's findings of fact) 
^Interestingly, none of the first three factors in Dixie were 
discussed Id The Utah Court of Appeals did not comment on 
the propriety of the tnal court's approach, presumably because 
the findings were so inadequate as to allow proper review Id 
at n 12 As an example, the Selvage court referred to 
Willey v Willey, 866 P2d 547 (Utah App 1993) In Willey, the 
tnal court reduced Mrs Willey's attorney fees, noting only 
that the amount of fees was a "very unfortunate use of funds " 
Id at 556 The court noted that "[w]hile this statement may 
indicate the tnal court believed both parties' fees were unrea-
sonable, it does not constitute a finding addressing the reason-
ableness of Mrs Willey's attorney fees " Id 
^^Brown, supra note 75 at 156 ("When a party is contractu-
ally entitled to attorney fees, the tnal court's findings regard-
ing those fees should be just as complete as its findings regard-
ing other types of contractual damages") 
105Quinn, supra note 69 at 286 
10o£ven ,f a practitioner does not contest the evidentiary sub 
missions of the party requesting attorney fees encouraging the 
tnal court to make findings may be worthwhile in the event the 
tnal court reduces fees sua sponte Without such findings a 
sua sponte reduction in fees is certain grounds for an appeal 
which will involve additional resources and will almost cer 
tainly give an opposing party opportunity to revisit the issue 
with the tnal court, perhaps obtaining a more favorable result 
*®' Although the courts have not required stnct adherence to a 
specific format for findings in support of an award of attorney 
fees "[ajs a matter of form it would [be] preferable for the 
tnal court to have entered separate findings of fact and con 
elusions of law in addition to the order and judgment for attor 
ney[] fees Cabrera supra note 12 at 625 
' "°As noted supra notes 67 through 72 and accompanying 
text, at minimum this should include some discussion ot each 
of the four factors identified in Dixie If additional factors are 
considered the tnal court should also be encouraged to make 
findings explaining why the additional considerations are rel 
evant 
109Baldwin \ Burton 850 P2d 1188 (Utah 1993) 
110Id at 1200 
1 l l
 James Constructors \ Salt Lake Cm Corp 888 P2d 665, 
671 72 (Utah App 1994) 
1 l2Smith v Batchelor 832 P2d 467, 473 (Utah 1992) 
u3Id at474 
"*Id (Stewart, J , dissenting) 
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Before BENCH, GARFF and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Plaintiff Ronald Draughon appeals from an order denying his 
motion for summary judgment and granting defendant CUNA Mutual 
Insurance Society's cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial 
court ruled that the credit life insurance policy CUNA issued to 
Draughon and his wife unambiguously excluded coverage for :the 
loss Draughon claimed. We reverse and remand with instructions to 
enter judgment for Draughon. 
FACTS 
In October of 1985, Draughon and his wife borrowed money from 
America First Credit Union to purchase an automobile. As part of 
this transaction, the Draughons bought a credit life insurance 
policy from CUNA. In relevant part, with our emphasis, the policy 
required CUNA to pay the remaining balance on the Draughons' 
automobile loan upon the death of either of them, but excluded 
coverage "if any material contributing cause of [death] was 
from sickness or injury which first became manifest prior to the 
time insurance coverage was otherwise effective. . . . " 
On the effective date of coverage, Mrs. Draughon suffered from 
a kidney disease which was treated by hemodialysis three times 
per week. Her physician testified at his deposition that with 
continuing treatments she was expected to live an otherwise 
normal life for another twenty to thirty years. Nonetheless, in 
http://loislaw.com/pns/docview.ta^ 4/6/2005 
November of 1985 Mrs. Draughon elected to undergo a kidney 
transplant operation. The operation itself was successful, but 
Mrs. Draughon developed acute pancreatitis as a consequence of an 
immunosuppressive steroid drug administered to help prevent 
rejection of the transplanted kidney.[fn1] The pancreatitis led 
to an internal abdominal infection 
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and, in turn, Mrs. Draughon1s 
fatal cardiac arrest on February 1, 1986. 
Shortly after his wife's death, Draughon filed a claim under 
the policy and demanded that CUNA pay off the America First loan. 
CUNA denied Draughon's claim, asserting that his wife's 
pre-existing kidney disease was a "material contributing cause" 
of her death for which coverage was excluded. Draughon then filed 
this action. Both he and CUNA filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment, and CUNA's motion was granted. The trial court held 
that Mrs. Draughon's pre-existing kidney disease was a "material 
contributing cause" of her death for which coverage was 
unambiguously excluded as a matter of law. The court reasoned 
that "[i]f not for her kidney disease, Mrs. Draughon would not 
have elected to undergo a kidney transplant. If she had not had 
the kidney transplant, she would not have been given steroid 
drugs which caused acute pancreatitis, which ultimately caused 
her death." 
On appeal, Draughon argues that the trial court erred by 
interpreting the phrase "material contributing cause" according 
to Oregon workers' compensation law. [fn2] Draughon contends that 
he, not CUNA, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law given 
the undisputed evidence before the trial court. 
OREGON CASES 
No reported Utah decision has interpreted the phrase "material 
contributing cause" in the context of an insurance policy 
exclusion. Nor could we, the parties, or the trial court locate 
any such compelling cases from other jurisdictions. Noting this 
lack of authority, the trial court sought to construe the phrase 
consistent with Oregon decisions involving claims under Oregon's 
workers' compensation statutory scheme. See Manous v. Argonaut 
Ins., 790r.App.645, 719 P.2d 1318, 1320 (1986). See also 
Peterson v. Eugene F. Burrill Lumber, 294 Or. 537, 
660 P.2d 1058, 1058 (1983); Grable v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 291 Or. 387, 
631P.2d768, 771-76 (1981); Standley v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 
8Qr.App.429, 495P.2d283, 285 (1972). 
The trial court's reliance on these cases is misplaced for two 
reasons. First, we fail to see the substantive relevance of 
Oregon's workers' compensation law to the interpretation of 
insurance contracts in Utah, even if the same phrase is involved 
in both instances. Second, these Oregon cases are not helpful 
here as they do not purport to define the phrase "material 
contributing cause," which is the task in this case. Rather, the 
Oregon courts utilize the phrase to further explain when an 
injury is deemed "arising out of" the injured person's employment 
for purposes of adjudicating entitlement to workers' compensation 
benefits. See, e.g., Olson v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 
222 Or. 407, 352 P.2d 1096, 1100 (1960). As the trial court here 
http://loislaw.com/pns/docview.htp?queiy=%28%28%22plain%22+%3CNEAR/20%3E+%... 4/6/2005 
correctly recognized, the Oregon courts1 only attempt to define 
the phrase "material contributing cause" is to say that such an 
event "need not be the sole or principal cause. . . . " Manous, 
719 P.2d at 1320. 
We conclude the Oregon cases are irrelevant to the present 
matter, and shed no light on the meaning of the phrase "material 
contributing cause" as used in the CUNA policy. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CUNA 
To sustain the judgment in favor of CUNA, we must conclude, as 
a matter of law, that Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was a 
"material contributing cause" of her 
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death. From all that 
appears, the phrase "material contributing cause" is not defined 
in the policy, [fn3] and it must be interpreted by us. CUNA bears 
the burden to prove Draughon's claim falls within the policy 
exclusion. See, e.g., LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 94 
Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 18, 765 P.2d 857 (1988); Whitlock v. Old Am. 
Ins. Co., 21 Utah_2d 131, 442_P,_2d 26, 27 (1968). 
Rules of Interpretation 
The interpretation of an integrated, unambiguous[fn4] contract 
is a question of law, and, accordingly, we give no particular 
deference to the trial court's interpretation. See, e.g., 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); Seashores 
Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). We 
construe the policy as we perceive it would be understood by the 
average, reasonable purchaser of insurance. See, e.g., LDS 
Hosp., 94 Utah Adv.Rep. at 17, 765 P.2d 857 (quoting Phil 
Schroeder, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 99 Wn.2d 65, 
659P.2d509, 511 (1983)); Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co., 204 Kan. 487, 
464 P.2d 253, 257 (1970) ("If a policy of insurance is clear and 
unambiguous, the words are to be taken and understood in their 
plain, ordinary and popular sense, as an average or reasonable 
person with ordinary understanding would construe them, when used 
to express the purpose for which they were employed in the 
policy."); Totten v. New York Life Ins. Co., 298 Or. 765, 
696 P.2d 1082, 1086 (1985) ("We interpret the terms of an insurance 
policy according to what we perceive to be the understanding of 
the ordinary purchaser of insurance."). See also G. Couch, 
Couch on Insurance 2d §§ 15:17,:18 (1984). More particularly, an 
insurer wishing to limit coverage through an exclusion must 
employ language clearly identifying the scope of the limitation. 
See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Reno's Executive Air, 
Inc., 100 Nev. 360, 682 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1984). Even if the 
policy employs technical terms, we do not construe it "through 
the magnifying eye of the technical lawyer," Wheeler v. 
Employer's Mut. Casualty Co., 211 Kan. 100, 505P.2d768, 772 
(1973), but rather as it would be understood by "one not trained 
in law or in the insurance business." National Union Fire Ins., 
682 P.2d at 1382. See also American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Esquire Labs of Arizona, 143 Ariz. 512, 694 P.2d 800, 808 
(Ct.App. 1984) ("an insurance policy must be read using the 
ordinary language of the average layman rather than by using 
technical medical, legal, insurance or statutory terms."). 
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"Material Contributing Cause" 
With the above rules of interpretation in mind, we note that 
the phrase "material contributing cause" as used in the CUNA 
policy is significant only as a legal concept of causation. The 
phrase is not employed to describe a person, place, or thing 
about which average purchasers of insurance can be expected to 
have much of an understanding. This compounds the insurer's 
burden to prove coverage is clearly excluded. For example, the 
meaning of the term "motor vehicle," when used in an insurance 
policy, may be somewhat unclear absent express definition. 
However, average persons have at least some understanding of the 
term's intended meaning because of its familiarity, and we 
construe it accordingly. See Clark, 464 P.2d at 257 ("the terms 
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'automobile,' 'motor vehicle' and 'vehicle' are of such common 
usage that an insured would understand the more limited aspects 
of the term 'automobile,' the broader facets of the term 'motor 
vehicle' and that the term 'vehicle' may include almost any means 
of [transportation].")/ Totten, 696 P.2d at 1087 (the phrase 
"any aircraft" is commonly understood to include hang gliders). 
Cf. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 751 P.2d248, 252 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988) (dispute as to whether the term "motor vehicles" 
includes motorcycles). Unlike "motor vehicle," the technical 
concept expressed through the phrase "material contributing 
cause" is not easily understood by an average policy purchaser 
untrained in the law. CUNA might have employed phrases and terms 
which plainly and clearly explain how the concept excludes 
coverage. Instead, it chose to employ a technical phrase having 
no relevant, prior judicial construction, and without explaining 
its significance in plain, understandable language .[fn5] 
As we see it, the average purchaser of insurance would 
understand the CUNA policy to exclude coverage where death is a 
natural, medically connected consequence of a pre-existing 
sickness or injury. The sickness or injury need not be the only 
cause of death, but there must be a medical link between the 
death and the disease. On the other hand, we think the average 
purchaser of insurance would not understand the policy to exclude 
coverage where a totally different illness caused by medical 
treatment for a pre-existing disease was the exclusive cause of 
death. If such an exclusion was intended, it is CUNA's 
responsibility to draft its policy to clearly convey this message 
to its insureds. Indeed, other insurers with such an intention 
have found a way to say so. See, e.g., Schick v. Nationwide Ins. 
Co., 117 Ohio App. 238, 192 N.E.2d 93, 94 (1962) (coverage 
excluded where death occurs "as the result of or by the 
contribution of disease . . . or medical or surgical treatment 
therefore or infection of any nature"); Perry v. Hartford 
Accident and Indem. Co., 256 Or. 73, 471 P.2d785, 786 (1970) 
(coverage excluded where death "caused by or resulting from . . . 
sickness or disease or medical or surgical treatment"). We will 
not insert words into a policy under the guise of interpretation 
where the insurer could have easily avoided the problem by 
drafting its policy more carefully and precisely. Cf. American 
Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 694 P.2d at 808 (an exclusion for "hair 
transplant" processes cannot be construed to apply to "hair 
implant" processes because those terms, as commonly understood, 
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refer to two distinctly different things). 
Moreover, our interpretation of the policy is entirely 
consistent with insightful hypothetical situations offered by the 
trial court in support of its ruling, and revisited by CUNA on 
appeal. The trial court explained that, in its view, coverage 
under the subject policy would be available where an insured 
cancer patient is hit by a car and killed while walking to the 
hospital to receive medical treatment. On the other hand, 
coverage would be excluded where an AIDS patient dies after 
contracting pneumonia. We do not take exception to this 
dichotomy. However, we find the distinction appropriate mainly 
because the AIDS patient's death from pneumonia is a natural, 
medical consequence of the underlying disease, whereas the cancer 
patient's being struck by an automobile is medically unrelated to 
the cancer. This is true even though "but for" the cancer or the 
AIDS, the patient in each scenario would not have encountered the 
precise event ultimately causing death. In our view, Mrs. 
Draughon's being struck with pancreatitis is more like the cancer 
patient being struck by a car than an AIDS patient being struck 
by pneumonia. 
Thus, CUNA is entitled to its summary judgment only if the 
undisputed evidence 
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establishes that Mrs. Draughon's kidney 
disease itself contributed naturally and medically to her death. 
As explained above, the requisite causal link is not established 
simply because "but for" her disease, she would not have had the 
transplant. Conversely, if the undisputed evidence establishes as 
a matter of law that the medical treatment Mrs. Draughon 
received caused her death, without contribution by her kidney 
disease, Draughon is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the evidence before the trial court requires the 
entry of a judgment for Draughon. CUNA has simply failed to meet 
its burden to prove Draughon's claim falls within the exclusion. 
The only evidence before the trial court, in addition to 
noncontradictory deposition testimony, was the affidavit of Dr. 
Wayne Border, Mrs. Draughon's last attending physician, and the 
affidavit of Dr. Robert Bond, who reviewed Mrs. Draughon's 
medical records following her death. Dr. Border asserts in his 
affidavit that Mrs. Draughon's death was caused by pancreatitis, 
an unusual complication of the kidney transplant but medically 
unrelated to her kidney disease. Dr. Bond stated in his affidavit 
that "pancreatitis was a complication that in all probability 
occurred as a result of the treatment that was done for Sandra 
Draughon's primary, underlying renal disease." 
Thus, the expert medical testimony in this case is undisputed 
and clearly establishes that Mrs. Draughon's underlying kidney 
disease did not contribute to her death in any natural or medical 
sense.[fn6] It is equally clear that she died exclusively as a 
consequence of the medical treatment she had received three 
months previously. [fn7] 
Accordingly, the judgment in favor of CUNA is reversed and the 
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case remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of 
Draughon. 
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ., concur. 
[fnl] Her reaction to the drug was described in one doctor's 
affidavit as "an unusual complication of kidney transplant 
operations and immunosuppresive treatment." 
[fn2] Draughon argues that the phrase "material contributing 
cause" should be interpreted to mean "proximate cause." This 
argument is without merit. The phrase "proximate cause" has a 
well-established meaning as a legal concept. If CUNA had this 
concept in mind when drafting the exclusion, it would have 
employed the precise term "proximate cause" or some other phrase 
having a similarly recognizable meaning. It is obvious that by 
choosing the phrase "material contributing cause" CUNA intended 
to exclude coverage in a broader range of circumstances than 
would the phrase "proximate cause." See, e.g., Minyen v. 
American Home Assurance Co., 443F.2d788, 790 (10th Cir. 1971); 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anglinf 306 So.2d 147/ 149 
(Fla.Ct.App. 1975). 
[fn3] Oddly, the actual policy does not appear in the record 
before us. Both parties were content to merely quote the key 
provision in their moving papers. Because seeing particular 
provisions in their overall context often aids interpretation, it 
is always preferable for courts to have access to the entire 
policy. See, e.g., LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 94 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 16, 17, 765 P.2d 857 (1988). 
[fn4] Draughon also argues that the phrase "material contributing 
cause" is inherently ambiguous because the term "material" 
creates a subjective standard of causation. We disagree. As will 
be established, we find the phrase unambiguous because it has a 
plain meaning understood by "a person of ordinary intelligence 
and understanding, viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in 
accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and 
in the light of existing circumstances." Auto Leasing Co. v. 
Central Mut. Ins. Co., 7Utah2d336, 325 P.2d 264, 266 (1958). 
See, e.g., LDS Hosp., 94 Utah Adv.Rep. at 17, 765 P.2d 857 
(applying the above standard to an insurance policy exclusion). 
[fn5] A limited exception to the doctrine favoring construction 
of insurance policies in accordance with an average layperson's 
understanding may exist where a technical phrase having a 
judicially established meaning is used. See G. Couch, Couch on 
Insurance § 15:17 (1984) (a technical phrase may be interpreted 
according to prior judicial construction even if the insured is 
unaware of that construction). 
[fn6] Ordinarily, the cause of death for purposes of entitlement 
to insurance coverage is a question for the jury. See, e.g., 
Whitlock v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 131, 442P.2d26, 27 
(1968). However, where, as here, the facts are undisputed, 
summary disposition is appropriate. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Anglin, 306So.2d147, 149 (Fla.Ct.App. 1975); Perry v. 
Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 256 Or. 73, 471 P.2d785, 789 
(1970). 
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[fn7] This is not to say that in every case a distinction between 
the causative effects of the disease and the treatment will be 
possible. In some situations, a disease and its treatment will be 
so inextricably linked as to make it impossible to distinguish 
between the two in determining a "material contributing cause" of 
death. 
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Robert A. Peterson, Salt Lake City, for petitioners. 
Jan Graham, Attorney General, Annina M. Mitchell, Assistant 
Attorney General, Salt Lake City, for Public Service 
Commission. 
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Molly Hastings, Douglas N. Owens, Seattle, WA, for U.S. West. 
Michael L. Ginsberg, Phillip C. Pugsley, Kent Walgren, 
Assistant Attorneys General, Salt Lake City, for intervenors. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
We hear this case on petition for review of a final agency 
action by the Public Service Commission (the Commission) 
determining the amount of reasonable attorney fees to be 
awarded to petitioners John J. Flynn and James L. Barker, Jr. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1) . We modify the Commission's 
decision as described below. 
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1994, we held that the Commission could not increase U.S. 
West Communications, Inc.'s (USWC) authorized rate of return on 
equity above a reasonable rate of return, that the statute 
permitting a public utility to veto a Commission decision 
constituted an unconstitutional delegation of power, and that 
the incentive rate regulation plan presented by the Commission 
was "arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful." Stewart v. Utah Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 773, 779, 781 (Utah 1994). The 
petitioning ratepayers were represented by attorneys Flynn and 
Barker. Given the important public interests vindicated by 
petitioners, we awarded them attorney fees, although not 
statutorily authorized, under two alternative theories — 
private attorney general or common fund. Id. at 783. This case 
was the first in which we awarded attorney fees not authorized 
by a contract or statute. Id. We remanded two issues to the 
Commission for decision: (1) the lawful rate of return on 
equity permitted to USWC and (2) the amount of reasonable 
attorney fees. Id. at 773, 783. 
In September 1995, the parties executed and filed a 
stipulation with the Commission requiring USWC to refund its 
ratepayers $3,212,852 plus interest, settling all issues on 
remand except attorney fees. In December, the Commission issued 
an order on refund which differed from the initial stipulation. 
In mid-January 1996, petitioners requested a rehearing on the 
refund order. The Commission granted this request and heard 
petitioners on January 31, 1996. On February 22, 1996, the 
Commission issued its "Order on Reconsideration of Order on 
Refund," dealing with the rate of return issues. 
Prior to its final resolution of the refund issues, on 
December 20, 1995, the Commission issued an order of attorney 
fees, reducing the reported hours spent on the case by 
twenty-five percent, compensating Flynn at $250 an hour and 
Barker at $175 an hour, rejecting application of a multiplier 
or an award of a percentage of the common fund, allowing 
payment of copying, postage, and other expenses, reducing 
paralegal compensation from the requested $50 to $25 per hour, 
denying compensation for secretarial work, and refusing to 
award any attorney fees related to the adjudication of the 
attorney fees themselves. The order further stated that 
attorney fees not in dispute that are "authorized by this 
order" should be paid "forthwith." Because the Commission found 
that USWC had to disgorge overcharges to its ratepayers, thus 
creating a common fund, the attorney fees awarded will come out 
of that fund. See Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783. 
In early January, believing that the Commission had 
unreasonably reduced their compensation, petitioners requested 
a rehearing on the attorney fees order. The Commission 
constructively rejected this request by failing to respond 
within twenty days. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3) (b) . 
Petitioners subsequently petitioned this court for a writ of 
review on the attorney fees order, and we granted the writ. 
II. JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to review "final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16 (1) . The Commission argues that this court lacks 
jurisdiction to review the attorney fees order because it does 
not represent a final agency action. We conclude that the 
record established that the order was final and that all 
parties viewed it as such until review. 
The Commission divided the questions presented by this 
court's remand in Stewart, 885 P.2d 759/ into two parts: one 
addressing attorney fees, the other addressing the appropriate 
rate of return and customer reimbursement. The Commission 
issued the attorney fees order first and the refund order 
second. The refund order does not change any aspect of the 
attorney fees order. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act does not specifically 
define "final agency action." However, it does say that an 
agency will contemplate reconsideration of an order only "if 
the order would otherwise constitute final agency action." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-13. We can thus assume the Commission 
considered the attorney fees order to be a final agency action 
by virtue of its failure to 
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indicate that the action was not final at the time of the 
rehearing request. The Commission merely denied the request for 
rehearing by nonaction instead of notifying petitioners that 
they would have to apply for rehearing at a later date. 
Moreover, the reconsideration of the refund order undertaken 
thereafter does not address the attorney fees order except to 
acknowledge it as final and appealable. The refund order 
specifically discusses what will happen if either party appeals 
the attorney fees order. [fn1] It never suggests that it supersedes 
or somehow subsumes the attorney fees order; it purports to 
modify only the earlier order and stipulation regarding the 
refund. Thus quite clearly, at the time of appeal, all parties 
understood the order on attorney fees to constitute an 
appealable final agency action. We see no reason to regard it 
differently. 
Because of the nature of agency proceedings, final actions 
often take place seriatim, disposing completely of discrete 
issues in one order while leaving other issues for later 
orders. Such orders will be final as to any issue fully decided 
by that order and appealable any time from the date of that 
order to the last day to appeal the last final agency action in 
the case. 
For assistance in defining "final agency action" more 
explicitly, we look to other state and federal laws which 
employ the term. The U.S. Supreme Court has held, with regard 
to the Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342 
(1988): 
[T]he relevant considerations in determining 
finality are whether the process of administrative 
decisionmaking has reached a stage where judicial 
review will not disrupt the orderly process of 
adjudication and whether rights or obligations 
have been determined or legal consequences will 
flow from the agency action. 
Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget 
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71, 91 S. Ct. 203, 209, 27 L.Ed.2d 
203 (1970); see also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 
797, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 2773-74, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992) 
(interpreting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 
(1988)). Similarly, the Model State Administrative Procedure 
Act defines final agency action negatively as "the whole or a 
part" of any action which is not "preliminary, preparatory, 
procedural, or intermediate with regard to subsequent agency 
action of that agency or another agency." 1981 Model State 
Admin. P. Act § 5-102(b)(2). 
The attorney fees order in this case meets both of these 
definitions. When the Commission failed to grant a rehearing on 
the order, it reached the end of its decision-making process on 
this issue. Hence judicial review at this point will not 
interfere with the Commission's proceedings. Moreover, the 
language of the order makes clear that the Commission 
determined obligations of the parties with which the parties 
must immediately comply. In addition, this order clearly falls 
under the Model Act's definition of "final" because it is not 
even arguably preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or 
intermediate. 
This ruling is consistent with prior Utah cases. The Utah 
cases on finality found no final order in the following 
circumstances: (1) a remand for further proceedings, Sloan v. 
Board of Review, 781 P.2d463, 464 (Utah Ct.App. 1989); (2) an 
order converting informal proceedings into formal ones, Merit 
Elec. & Instrumentation v. Department of Commerce, 
902 P.2d 151, 153 (Utah Ct.App. 1995); and (3) a denial of a motion to 
dismiss, Barney v. Division of Occupational & Professional 
Licensing, 828 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). These cases 
do not involve actions in the nature of a seriatim final order; 
they all involve preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or 
intermediate decisions. Thus our holding today merely clarifies 
the definition of "final agency action" rather than changing 
it. 
We emphasize, however, that this rule applies only to 
administrative determinations. It does not in any way affect 
the rules of 
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appealability governing cases from the district court and the 
court of appeals. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Ordinarily, we review attorney fee awards under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 897 
(Utah 1996) (Russon, J., dissenting) (stating standard of 
review in which three justices concur). However, in a case such 
as this, where the trier of fact is one of the parties whose 
actions we adjudicated prior to remand, we believe that 
fairness requires review of the Commission's findings on 
attorney fees under an intermediate standard, affording the 
Commission some discretion, as in mixed fact and law 
determination. See State v. Pena, 869P.2d932, 938 (Utah 1994) 
(stating that "policy reasons" can require court to limit 
o/ooo/ooo/ ^/^Ti^/^oT^o/.^Trn^nnonozonoz A nznnnz 
discretion afforded lower court). 
The dual role of advocate and adjudicator occasionally 
creates potential for at least the appearance of conflicts of 
interest for administrative agencies. See V-1 oil v. Department 
of Envtl. Quality, 939 P.2d 1192, 1196-98 (Utah 1997). This 
risk seems particularly realistic where an agency is required 
to determine compensation due to attorneys1 representing 
parties who have defeated the agency's position in an 
adversarial proceeding. 
Under these circumstances, due process requires a somewhat 
heightened standard of review. See Utah Const, art. I, § 7. In 
Anderson v. Industrial Commission, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 
1985), for example, we noted, "Fairness requires not only an 
absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even the 
possibility of unfairness." We reiterated this sentiment in 
Bunnell v. Industrial Commission, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333-34 (Utah 
1987), where we held that an administrative law judge's 
behavior suggested partiality warranting a remand. 
In Stewart, this court pointedly criticized the Commission's 
actions and ruled in the petitioners' favor. Despite our 
complete confidence in the professionalism of the Commission, a 
potential for the appearance of bias exists in this situation. 
This is particularly true where the Commission must make 
subjective determinations about the attorneys' skills, the 
quality of the results obtained, and the difficulty of the 
questions involved, as required in attorney fee determinations. 
The federal government and some states have handled this 
problem by giving the court that overturns an agency's ruling 
permission to determine attorney fees. E.g., 5 U.S.C.S. § 
504(c)(1) (Law.Co-op. 1989) & 28 U.S.C.S. § 2412(d)(3) 
(Law.Co-op. 1990); 5 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 100/10-55(c) (West 
1993) . 
In Utah, because final agency actions are reviewed directly 
by appellate courts, determining attorney fees without a prior 
record on the issue would place an unrealistic burden on the 
appellate system; appellate courts are not designed to hear 
fact questions. Therefore, asking the Commission to hear 
evidence and make findings of fact, on the amount of attorney 
fees makes sense. However, to prevent the possibility of 
unfairness, we will undertake a moderate degree of scrutiny of 
the agency's determinations on the appropriateness of the award 
amount. 
Moreover, as petitioners point out, the relief they acquired 
was fashioned by this court in Stewart; thus, we have an 
advantage in assessing its value. We generally give deference 
on attorney fee determinations to the " 'judge who actually 
presided over the proceeding and has first-hand familiarity 
with the litigation,' " Salmon, 916 P.2d at 892-93 (quoting 
Utah Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1991)), and in these circumstances, giving weight to 
this court's similar familiarity is appropriate. Reviewing the 
Commission's determination under an intermediate standard in 
this case, however, follows prior policy in addition to 
preserving both the appearance of fairness and fairness itself. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES AWARD 
Courts award attorney fees for various reasons in various 
ways. See generally Court Awarded Attorney Fees,, Report of the 
Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237. As stated above, 
because the result in Stewart created a common fund, the 
attorneys in this matter mill receive their compensation 
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from that fund. Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783. Courts award attorney 
fees in common fund cases "to avoid the unjust enrichment of 
those who benefit from the fund that is created . . . by the 
litigation and who otherwise would bear none of the litigation 
costs." Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. at 250. In this 
case, Barker and Flynn, at the request of a few ratepayers, 
undertook enormous investments of time and money which, after 
six years, accrued to the benefit of all U.S. West ratepayers 
in Utah. Thus, the traditional common fund theory applies; the 
ratepayer beneficiaries should not receive the benefit of the 
attorneys' work without compensating them. 
With this rationale in mind, we consider what constitutes 
reasonable attorney fees. In Stewart, we directed the 
Commission to award fees in accordance with our decision in 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985) . Stewart, 
885 P.2d at 783. Cabrera was a fee shifting case, where the 
opposition, as opposed to the beneficiaries of the fund, paid 
the attorney fees. In that case, we instructed trial judges 
making attorney fee determinations to consult the Utah Code of 
Professional Responsibility DR 2-106. [fn2] Cabrera, 694 P. 2d at 
624. In deciding if a fee is generally reasonable, a court 
should consider the following: 
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment 
will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services; 
(4) The amount involved and results obtained; 
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client 
or by the circumstances; 
(6) The nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; 
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
Stewart is the first Utah case to permit attorney fees not 
explicitly authorized by statute or contract. Stewart, 885 P.2d 
o/ooo/ooo/^oAi7rM)T^o/.^t:n/:nAonozooo/_ /i n^/ofin^ 
at 782. This case represents the first time we have supervised 
an award under the common fund theory. See id. at 782-83. 
Therefore, we must account for ways in which such awards might 
require adjustments to the principles affecting ordinary 
attorney fee cases. 
As courts often do, we will use the lodestar method in 
considering the attorney fees in this case. See Court Awarded 
Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. at 242-43. An alternative approach -
the percentage of the fund method, described in id. at 255 — 
is available, but we apply the lodestar method because the 
Commission chose to use that method. The lodestar method 
requires a determination of the hours reasonably expended on 
the case as well as a reasonable hourly rate for the services. 
Id. at 243. These two amounts are multiplied, and the total is 
increased or decreased to account for the level of the risk 
involved in the case and the quality of the work. Id.; see also 
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (clarifying 
lodestar method set forth in earlier opinion of same case, 
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973)). Courts often refer to this adjustment 
of the basic hourly award as a "multiplier." Court Awarded 
Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. at 243. We specifically addressed the 
factors implicated by the use of a multiplier in Plumb v. 
State, 809P.2d734, 740 n. 7 (Utah 1990). There, citing Lindy, 
we delineated five factors to consider explicitly in fixing a 
multiplier: (1) the quality of work performed, (2) the 
contingent nature of the case, [fn3] (3) the 
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plaintiffs burden, (4) the risks assumed, and (5) the delay in 
payment. Id. 
The Commission agreed to compensate Flynn's time at $250 an 
hour and Barker's at $175 an hour, and petitioners do not 
object to these rates. They do, however, take issue with a 
number of the Commission's other findings, which we address 
below. 
A. Twenty-Five Percent Reduction 
of Hours Reported 
The Commission reduced the number of hours spent by Barker 
and Flynn on the Stewart case by twenty-five percent. 
Petitioners argue that the reduction violated due process 
principles because no one presented the Commission's reasons 
for reduction at the hearing on fees, depriving petitioners of 
an opportunity to respond. The Commission contends that it made 
the twenty-five percent reduction because the attorneys' time 
records lacked meaningful detail; Barker reconstructed his time 
spent on the case; two attorneys spent time on the same task; 
the records reflected inconsistencies in time billed for the 
same task; and the time billed for certain tasks appeared 
excessive on its face. 
The Commission did not violate petitioners' due process 
rights in making its findings. In Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743, we 
held that a magistrate violated a class counsel's due process 
rights by making an attorney fee determination without 
counsel's having notice and by failing to hold a hearing on the 
issue. Here, petitioners had adequate notice of the hearing and 
presented testimony and evidence in support of their case. 
Furthermore, the hearing transcript reflects the Commission's 
concerns, for example, when one Commissioner remarked, "[T]he 
Division and the Committee have attacked [Flynnfs hours] on 
various grounds[,] one of which was they are not sufficiently 
detailed." Therefore, petitioners had an opportunity at the 
hearing to respond to the Commission's concerns, and the 
Commission did not violate their right to due process. 
Thus the Commission's twenty-five percent reduction 
multiplier was not procedurally deficient. We examine the 
evidence, however, to determine whether the reduction was 
justified on substantial grounds. In petitioners' favor, Flynn 
clarified at the hearing that the twenty-three hours recorded 
as "reading" a brief included checking and reading cases, 
statutes, and other materials as part of reviewing the 112-page 
brief. Moreover, both petitioners made statements under oath 
that they had understated their hours in the written 
submissions by at least twenty-five percent. These statements 
went uncontested. Furthermore, Dr. Mark Glick, a consultant on 
law and economics issues, testified that petitioners expended 
an unusually low number of hours for a case of this nature. An 
affidavit by Patricia A. O'Rorke, who practices law in the 
public utility area in Utah, testified that Flynn and Barker 
worked the number of hours "reasonably required to achieve the 
very substantial benefit conferred on the plaintiff class." 
Nevertheless, one affidavit — by Gary A. Dodge, a partner 
specializing in utility and regulatory matters at the law firm 
of Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee — does state that the 
reported hours seem "excessive" for the work performed, and the 
descriptions of the work performed provide too little 
information to decide otherwise. Yet, his testimony also 
suggests that Flynn's expertise should have reduced the number 
of hours needed, indicating that Flynn's hours were a bargain, 
not just reasonable. The Commission also points to occasional 
inconsistencies in the time records, with Barker at times 
recording more hours than the other participants for the same 
meetings. 
Barker and Flynn initially accepted this case on a pro bono 
basis. In February 1991, they realized they could not dispose 
of the case as quickly as they had initially thought. At that 
point, they asserted a request for attorney fees. They realized 
that Utah had not previously allowed an award of attorney fees 
without statutory or contractual authorization, but because the 
question had never been directly addressed, they decided to 
pursue it. Because of this history, Barker's failure to log his 
time simultaneously and Flynn's general time-keeping methods 
are understandable. The records available do provide a 
sufficient basis for a determination of the hours they worked. 
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Although we accord the Commission limited discretion in 
determining the hours in this case, after reviewing the record 
in light of the Cabrera factors, we award the full amount of 
hours claimed by Flynn[fn3a] and all but 9.5 hours claimed 
by Barker.[fn4] The evidence presented simply does not support 
the Commission's arbitrary twenty-five percent reduction. 
Considering, as required by Cabrera, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions in Stewart, petitioners' hours 
are entirely reasonable. The Commission found that,the case was not 
novel or difficult in view of one of Flynn's comments — that 
the issues at the Commission level were clear-cut in his clients' favor. 
Aside from the obvious observation that most advocates find the 
law "clear" in their favor, the Commission's position also 
ignores Flynn's testimony that a novel question of mootness 
arose at the appellate level, requiring much work. In addition, 
the attorney fees issue itself was clearly novel for Utah, as 
discussed by the court in Stewart. 885 P.2d at 782. A reading 
of Stewart further indicates that many issues were at 
least complex, if not novel. Moreover, as noted in Stewart, the 
complete lack of support from the Committee of Consumer 
Services and the actions of the Division and the Commission 
generally made this case very difficult. See generally Id. 
Furthermore, Flynn adequately explained why some of his 
hours, which appeared excessive at first glance, actually 
constituted reasonable work (such as the brief "reading" 
example described earlier). With regard to experience, Flynn's 
expertise in the areas of both state constitutional law and 
utility law and Barker's knowledge of utility law convince us 
that less knowledgeable attorneys performing the same work 
would have taken much longer. Moreover, we do not believe that 
anything in the financial arrangements between petitioners and 
their clients caused petitioners to expend excessive hours on 
the case. Flynn and Barker knew very well the possibility of 
receiving no remuneration for their time and work. Such 
knowledge would surely motivate efficiency rather than the 
reverse. 
The inconsistencies between times recorded in Barker's 
records and those of Flynn and a paralegal are of some concern; 
they may be attributable to the fact that Barker did not keep 
contemporaneous records, as Flynn did. Thus, we reduce Barker's 
hours to reflect the hours spent by other members of the 
litigation team at the same meetings. [fn5] With this adjustment, we 
can confidently conclude that Barker claimed a reasonable 
number of hours. 
B. Failure to Use a Multiplier 
The Commission further argues that the number of hours times 
the hourly rate of each attorney equals a reasonable attorney 
fee and that it correctly refused to increase that amount by a 
multiplier. 
Petitioners argue that the Commission had to increase the 
total fee by a multiplier to account for their risk of 
nonpayment, the results they obtained, the complexity of the 
case, the burdens undertaken, the efficiency of service, and 
the delay in compensation. They argue that the Stewart decision 
established the law of the case, specifically finding that all 
these factors were present and thus mandating the application 
of a multiplier. 
As stated above, we consider five factors in awarding a 
multiplier: (1) the quality of work performed, (2) the 
contingent nature of the case, (3) the plaintiffs burden, (4) 
the risks assumed, and (5) delay in payment. The Commission 
made no findings of fact on the quality of work performed, but 
it did, by implication, account for the quality of petitioners1 
work in large measure when it approved the hourly rates 
petitioners requested. The record reflects that the rates 
Barker and Flynn requested rank among the highest in Salt Lake 
City. They can charge such amounts in part because of the 
overall 
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quality of their work as evidenced by their reputations. In 
considering use of a multiplier, we do not intend to reward 
them twice for the same quality. Instead, when considering 
whether to award a multiplier for the quality of the work 
performed, we must consider whether the quality of work in this 
specific case exceeded the quality of work these attorneys 
usually produce. Lindy, the case originating the lodestar 
method, suggests the following considerations in making this 
determination: 
1. The result obtained evaluated in terms of (a) 
the potential money damages avaiilable to the class 
member, i.e., a comparison of the extent of 
possible recovery with the amount of actual verdict 
or settlement; (b) the benefit — monetary or 
nonmonetary — conferred on the class. . . . 
2. An evaluation of the professional methods 
utilized in processing the case, — rewarding the 
use of efficient methods to expedite the case and 
penalizing the use of methods the predominant 
purpose of which was to delay or obstruct the 
proceedings. 
Lindy, 540 F.2d at 118. Although the second consideration has 
no particular relevance to this case, the first provides useful 
insight. Petitioners' advocacy resulted in a refund to 
ratepayers of $4,630,164, including interest. Considering that 
even when this court disposed of the Stewart case in 1994, we 
still did not know whether the ratepayers would receive any 
money, Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783, this result is quite 
remarkable. In addition to monetary benefits, the ratepayers 
received nonmonetary, permanent benefits in that USWC is 
precluded from seeking excessive rates well into the future, 
thus eliminating the need for further or continued litigation. 
Given these extraordinary results, petitioners are entitled to 
additional monetary recognition for the quality of their work. 
The Commission failed to recognize these results. Therefore, 
its decision not to award a multiplier should be disregarded. 
To determine the contingent nature of the case, 
Lindy suggests that we evaluate the last three factors: the 
plaintiff's burden, the risks assumed, and the delay in 
payment. Lindy, 540 F.2d at 117. At the outset, we note that 
the Commission deemed the initial pro bono nature of 
petitioners' relationship with their clients to militate 
against the use of a multiplier, because petitioners did not 
really expect to receive payment. Whether the attorneys 
provided their services pro bono, at a discount, or at full 
market rate does not effect a determination of reasonable 
attorney fees. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886/ 895, 104 
S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 
713 F.2d546, 551 (10th Cir. 1983). Although both these cases 
concern a federal civil rights statute, the rationale that 
justifies their findings is the same: The rule instructs courts 
to consider the market rate for legal services, not to reduce 
the rates for pro bono services or reduced costs. See id. 
Holding otherwise would only discourage lawyers from taking 
such cases pro bono in the future. To the contrary, we wish to 
encourage the kind of public service performed by Barker and 
Flynn in taking this case despite the huge time commitment and 
significant risk of nonpayment. The Commission misunderstood 
the law on this point. Therefore, this aspect of its decision 
merits no deference. 
Looking next at the question of petitioners' burden, we 
reiterate that the Stewart case involved novel and difficult 
questions. [fn6] It lasted six years, required a writ of review to 
the state supreme court (which took two years to decide), and 
included only the slightest possibility of payment. Petitioners 
deserve the application of a multiplier to account for the 
burdens this history reflects. 
Moreover, in evaluating the risks assumed, the uncertainty of 
payment in this case was very high; its availability was a 
question of first impression. In addition, petitioners had 
agreed to represent the rate-payers pro bono and thus could not 
even rely on payment contingent upon their success in court. 
Thus petitioners undertook significant financial risks. 
Traditional contingency fee arrangements provide us with some 
guidance in this case, in that the burdens and risks to counsel 
in 
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contingency cases are similar. Two of petitioners' affiants 
contend, and respondents do not contradict, that contingency 
fee cases in Utah requiring appeal usually set the fee at forty 
percent of the recovery. By using a percentage, the contingency 
fee arrangement accounts for results obtained and the amount 
involved, as required by Cabrera, in addition to the factors of 
risk and delay in payment. 
Finally, Flynn and Barker should receive some additional 
amount to account for the lost use of the money they would have 
received at the end of the case in normal contingency 
circumstances. In an ordinary contingency case, the percentage 
recovery is designed to account for the lost use of income 
during the course of the case. Contingency contracts, however, 
need not consider the extra time required in this case to 
settle attorney fees, and some compensation is due petitioners 
for the value of that loss. 
To calculate what a contingency fee would have been in this 
case, we take forty percent (the percentage generally charged 
in contingency fee cases where there is an appeal) of the 
$4,630,164 recovery generated by Barker and Flynn, which equals 
$1,852,065.60. As stated above, Flynn worked 1607.25 hours at 
$250 an hour, totaling $401,812.50. Barker worked 451 hours at 
$175 an hour, totaling $78,925. Thus petitioners1 time alone is 
worth $480,737.50. We award a multiplier to take into 
consideration delay of payment, risk, quality of work, 
contingency, and the plaintiffs burden. However, when the 
common fund is quite high, as in this case, the percentage 
recovery should be reduced. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 
108 F.R.D. at 256; see e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Product 
Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(awarding over $10,000,000 in attorney fees, less than six 
percent of common fund). Therefore, although a multiplier of 
four would more closely approximate the contingency 
arrangement, a multiplier of 2.5, equaling $1,201,843.75, is 
more appropriate given the size of the fund. In light of the 
Cabrera factors, we hold that $1,201,843.75 represents a 
reasonable attorney fee in this exceptional case. 
C. Fifty Percent Reduction 
of Paralegal Fees 
This court has approved fee awards to paralegals, law clerks, 
and legal assistants as a way of encouraging cost-effective 
lawyering. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1200-01 (Utah 
1993). A court must base attorney fee awards on the evidence 
and support them by findings of fact. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. 
Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992). 
The Commission awarded paralegal fees at $25 an hour, stating 
as justification that neither employee had paralegal training. 
One "paralegal," Funk, is a consumer advocate in utility 
matters. The other, McDermott, had finished his third year of 
law school but had not taken the bar exam when he performed the 
research in question. The affidavits submitted by both sides 
support paralegal fees of at least $45 an hour. One affidavit 
states that research assistants receive $60 an hour, while 
another identifies $35 to $50 as the going rate. The $25 figure 
comes from Funk's affidavit; he had done contract work for the 
Commission at $25 an hour. 
The record does not support the reduction in paralegal 
compensation to $25. The $25 rate paid to Funk by the 
Commission was for drafting legislation and the like, not for 
paralegal work. The rule discussed above requiring payment of 
the going rate for attorney fees applies with equal force to 
paralegal fees. Public agencies often pay a reduced rate, but 
the private rate sets the standard. Given the evidence in the 
record, the paralegals should have been compensated at $45 an 
hour at least. 
However, because we have chosen to use the contingency fee to 
approximate payment in this case, we do not award an additional 
amount for paralegal fees and costs generally, because the 
contingency fee scenario already encompasses these amounts. 
D. Attorney Fee Litigation 
Petitioners request attorney fees for the litigation of the 
attorney fee issue. In their favor, they cite Salmon, where we 
•n ' "»• r^r\ / /•* /-»/\ • s\ / ^ T T T/-"XT^» "|-*v l\ / ' M i A / ' A A n Ar t / r\C\t\ / A I^C l<-\(\(\C 
stated, "[I]f a vindicated employee is required to 
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expend attorney fees to recover the original fees to which he 
was entitled, the cost of these subsequent fees must also be 
reimbursed." Salmon, 916 P.2d at 896. Salmon, however, is a fee 
shifting case. In this case, we awarded petitioners fees under 
the common fund theory, to prevent the beneficiaries of their 
efforts from receiving a benefit without having to pay for 
their services. The common fund theory does not justify 
awarding petitioners fees for litigating the amount of the fee 
award. See Llndy, 540 F.2d at 111 ("There being no benefit to 
the fund from services performed by [attorneys] in connection 
with their fee application, there should be no attorneys1 fee 
award from the fund for those services."). 
The fees we award petitioners today compensate for the 
benefits they achieved on behalf of the ratepayers. Their 
litigation of the attorney fee issue benefits only themselves; 
thus we conclude that they should bear the burden of that 
expense. That they had to litigate the issue is not the "fault" 
of the ratepayers, as it would be the fault of the opposing 
party in a fee shifting case. In a common fund case, no one is 
being "punished." Rather, all parties must simply bear their 
own burden. Thus we hold that as a matter of law, petitioners 
must pay their own costs for their litigation of the attorney 
fee issue. 
We award petitioners $1,201,843.75 less costs and fees of 
$370,576.30 paid pursuant to the Commission order to compensate 
for their costs and fees relating to the Stewart case. 
STEWART and RUSSON, JJ., concur in Justice DURHAM'S opinion. 
[fnl] The order specifically states, "[I]f any party appealed 
the Commission's Order on attorney fees . . ., U.S. West 
Communications, Inc. . . . would not need to make the refund 
or pay the attorney fees until the amount of attorney fees was 
finally determined." 
[fn2] Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) Code of Professional 
Responsibility has since been designated Rules of Professional 
Conduct, but rule has not changed. 
[fn3] We are aware of the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of an 
increase for contingency cases in fee shifting determinations. 
See Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567, 112 S.Ct, 2638, 
2644, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992). We do not believe that the 
Court's reasoning has equal force in common fund cases. 
[fn3a] 1607.25 hours. 
[fn4] 451 hours. 
[fn5] Treating all discrepancies in favor of Flynn and the paralegal 
who kept contemporaneous records, we reduce Barker's claim of 
4 60.5 hours by 9.5 hours. 
[fn6] See supra section IV.A. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting: 
I dissent. I would affirm the award of attorney fees made by 
the Commission. 
Although the majority professes "our complete confidence in 
the professionalism of the Commission," it then proceeds to 
accord no confidence in its award of fees by reversing the 
Commission on every determination of fact and law made by it. 
The majority departs from our general rule of reviewing 
awards of fees under an abuse of discretion standard and 
instead imposes a heightened standard, not because of any bias 
demonstrated by the Commission but because there is "a 
potential for the appearance of bias." 
The setting of fees here by the Commission is not different 
from the everyday occurrence in the trial courts, where trial 
judges who have been reversed on appeal are called upon to fix 
a reasonable fee for the attorney who prosecuted the appeal and 
was responsible for reversing the judge. Yet we have never 
presumed that the judge could not be fair in such a situation 
and imposed a heightened scrutiny in reviewing the judge's 
award. We should not treat the Commission differently. The 
members are entitled to our respect and confidence, and we 
should not review their work with suspicion. So far as I know, 
we have never reversed a judgment simply because "there is a 
potential for the appearance of bias." We have always required 
that bias be demonstrated. That has not been done here. 
The award of fees made by the Commission is well supported by 
the evidence, which has always been the standard by which we 
have reviewed awards of fees. While the majority recites 
evidence supporting the Commission's award, it gives no weight 
to that evidence. Instead, the majority makes a de novo 
determination of the factual issues which the Commission made 
in setting a reasonable fee. For example, the Commission 
reduced by twenty-five percent the number of hours for which 
the attorneys should be compensated. This reduction was made 
because the attorneys' time records lacked meaningful detail; 
Barker reconstructed his time spent on the case; two attorneys 
spent time on the same task; the records reflected 
inconsistencies in time billed for the same task; and the time 
billed for certain tasks appeared excessive on its face. In any 
other case, this explanation would suffice, and we would not 
hesitate to affirm the award made. But here, even though the 
explanation is 
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supported by the affidavit of Gary A. Dodge, a capable 
practicing attorney, the majority rejects the Commission's 
explanation because Barker and Flynn testified that they had 
understated their hours by at least twenty-five percent and 
observes that their testimony went uncontested. Of course it 
went uncontested; it was subjective and incapable of being 
challenged by anyone. But the Commission as the fact finder was 
not required to believe their testimony. Nevertheless, the 
majority reverses the Commission on disputed facts and 
substitutes themselves as the fact finders. 
In a similar manner, the majority reverses the Commission's 
determination that $25 per hour was a reasonable rate for Funk 
and McDermott, who were not paralegals. Indeed, Funk had done 
work for the Commission at $25 per hour, and McDermott was a 
law student. Yet the majority rejects this reasoning of the 
Commission and awards them "$45 an hour at least," the rate for 
paralegals, which they admittedly were not. Again, the majority 
rolls over the Commission's factual determination. 
The majority recognizes that "the rates Barker and Flynn 
requested rank among the highest in Salt Lake City." Barker 
will receive $175 for every hour requested except for the 
9.5-hour token reduction made by the majority. Flynn will 
receive $250 per hour for every hour he requested. But it seems 
that is not enough. The majority then proceeds to apply a 
multiplier of 2.5. 
I do not discount the value of the service provided by the 
attorneys. They deserve to be fairly compensated. But when they 
are awarded compensation for almost every hour they requested, 
even though their time records were subject to question and 
they are paid at the highest rates known in this community, I 
fail to see the necessity of or fairness in applying a 
multiplier. The attorneys took the case on a pro bono basis and 
had no agreement with anyone for a fee. They are to be 
commended for their public spirit and hard work. I would leave 
them with their handsome fee determined without a multiplier 
and would not shower them with a windfall. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., concurs in Associate Chief Justice HOWE's 
dissenting opinion. 
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